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Abstract
Among all emerging quantum information technologies, quantum key
distribution (QKD) is one of the most developed techniques. QKD
harnesses the intrinsic laws of quantum mechanics to provide a method
for distributing secret random keys, which can be used for data en-
cryption and decryption between two intended users. QKD has already
been demonstrated in different scenarios over optical fibre and in at-
mospheric channels. QKD has also been used for security assurance
in several network settings, in addition of being commercially avail-
able today. Despite remarkable progress in QKD systems, conveni-
ent access to the developing quantum communications networks is
still missing. Adopting QKD in mobile devices would enable such
a service, particularly, in indoor environments. This is in line with
the recent advancement in fabricating microchip-scale QKD devices,
which would ease this incorporation into mobile devices. This work
focuses on the access networks, and, in particular, it addresses the
wireless mode of access in indoor environments for QKD networks.
We find a practical regime of operation, where, in the presence of ex-
ternal light sources and loss, secret keys can be exchanged. We then
propose practical configurations that would enable wireless access to
hybrid quantum-classical networks. The proposed setups would allow
an indoor wireless user, equipped with a QKD-enabled mobile device,
to communicate securely with a remote party on the other end of
the access network. We account for adverse effects of the background
noise induced by Raman scattered light on the QKD receivers due to
the transmission of both quantum and classical signals over the same
fibre. In addition, we consider the loss and the background noise that
arise from indoor environments. We consider a number of discrete
and continuous-variable QKD protocols and study their performance
in different scenarios. In our analysis we consider the asymptotic
scenario, as well as the finite-size key effects. In the former case, an
infinite number of signals are assumed to be exchanged between the
sender and the recipient, whereas in the latter, which represents the
v
practical scenario, a finite number of signals are exchanged between
the two users. Our results indicate that a feasible regime of operation
for wireless QKD exists. This makes the QKD technologies available
to end users of a communications network.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Information and communications technologies have an enormous impact on our
daily lives. In particularly, data security is a significant issue, especially when
dealing with smart adversaries who have powerful tools. Cryptographic tech-
niques can achieve the goal of data protection by converting data into a format
inaccessible to an unauthorised party. Such techniques today are based on the
Kerckhoffs’ concept Petitcolas [2011], in which, except for the key, an attacker is
assumed to have a full knowledge of the cryptographic algorithm being used. In
this case, in order to have a successful cryptographic scheme, we need to guar-
antee the security of its ingredients, such as the underlying key. Yet, there are
many cases in which data security has been compromised. In fact, the security
in many cryptography systems is currently based on the complexity of compu-
tations. That would urge us to find a better solution to guarantee the security
of our data communication. In principle, in order to ensure the security, the key
must be random (unpredictable to an eavesdropper), unique, and distributed in
a secure way. Fortunately, such criteria can be fulfilled in practice using quantum
key distribution (QKD) techniques. This technique allows two remote users to
establish a sequence of secure bits, called a secret key. The resulted keys can then
be used for securing the transmission of classical information. This thesis is an
attempt to make QKD technologies available to a wide group of users.
1
1.1 Background
Cryptography is an essential tool for data security in many aspects of our daily
life, such as online banking services. From ancient times to present days, the cryp-
tography has been used as an effective means to guarantee the confidentiality in
data exchange. It is thought that the Romans began the idea of cryptography
to convey a message securely to its intended destination. They used a simple
means of encryption by replacing each letter in the original message with a letter
three positions along in the alphabet to hide the content of the plaintext Dusek
et al. [2006]. In 1926, the American scientist, Gilbert Vernam, invented a cryp-
tographic approach known as one-time pad (OTP) Vernam [1926], which would
provide unconditional security by assuming that the legitimate parties have pre-
viously shared a secret key. Yet, the distribution of keys in a secure way remains
to be a challenge. Since then, cryptography has evolved gradually until attaining
the existing advanced methods. The problem in the current cryptographic sys-
tems is that the security depends on the computational hardness, so the security
of such systems will be always threatened. Alternatively, quantum cryptography,
particularly QKD, is being developed nowadays to achieve unlimited security due
to its dependence on the properties of quantum mechanics. As a result, QKD
can generate and distribute a secret key even in the presence of an eavesdropper,
Eve, who assumed to have an unlimited computational power.
The concept of quantum cryptography goes back to 1969, when a graduate
student, Steven Wiesner, came up with the idea of quantum money Wiesner
[1983]. The original manuscript, which passed unnoticed, was written circa 1970.
By exploiting the properties of quantum mechanics, Wiesner decided to create
bank notes which cannot be counterfeited. Even though his idea was not im-
plemented in practice Imre & Gyongyosi [2012], it was the main motivation to
Bennett and Brassard who introduced the first QKD protocol in 1984 Bennett
[1984]. Nowadays, QKD has become the most popular technique among quantum
communication technologies. It provides, in principle, an absolute secure method
for keys distribution in comparison with the existing classical schemes.
The current dominant approach for ensuring data security over the Internet
is based on a combination of public-key cryptography, e.g., the Rivest-Shamir-
Adleman (RSA) protocol Rivest et al. [1978], for exchanging a secret key/seed,
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and symmetric-key cryptography protocols, such as advanced encryption stand-
ard (AES) or secure hash algorithm, for encryption, decryption, and authentica-
tion. The security of RSA is, however, based on the computational complexity of
the factoring problem. The latter does not have any known efficient solutions on
classical computers, but there exists a quantum algorithm using which one can
solve the factoring problem in polynomial time Shor [1994]. This is a huge threat
to the security of our online communications, such as email correspondence and
banking transactions, especially considering the progress made in the past few
years in quantum computing Barends et al. [2016], Johnson et al. [2011], Moran
[2016], Shor [1994]. Note that, although symmetric-key algorithms such as AES
may now be considered safe against quantum attacks Campagna et al. [2015],
the initial input keys to such algorithms are currently distributed between two
remote users using public-key schemes, which are vulnerable to quantum attacks.
This would necessitate the implementation of alternative solutions, such as QKD,
at large scale to offer data security to every individual user.
It is then important to utilize the advantages of this scheme not only in niche
markets but also for the general public Razavi [2011, 2012]. This necessitates
developing hybrid quantum-classical networks that support many users. This re-
quires revisiting the requirements at both access and core parts of the network.
Indeed, future communications networks must offer improved security features
against possible attacks enabled by quantum computing technologies. One pos-
sible solution is to develop quantum-classical networks that allow any two users
to, not only exchange data, but also share secret key bits using QKD techniques.
Despite the recent progress in QKD systems, more work needs to be done to make
QKD conveniently available to the end users of communications networks. This
can be possibly achieved by combing QKD with optical wireless communications
(OWC).
The OWC technology has boomed and become a competitive method to radio
techniques to connect computers and personal devices wirelessly Ramirez-Iniguez
et al. [2008]. Due to its impressive properties, especially the higher bandwidth,
optical wireless systems are utilized in many applications, such as hospitals and
banks. One possible challenge of using OWC for QKD purposes is the existence
of background noise caused by the artificial sources, as well as the sunlight, all
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affecting the performance of the underlying QKD system. This work focuses on
the access networks, and, in particular, it addresses the wireless mode of access
in indoor environments to the developing QKD networks.
1.2 Quantum key distribution overview
In conventional QKD protocols, an eavesdropper, Eve, cannot intercept the key
without disturbing the system, and accordingly having her presence discovered.
Furthermore, because of the no-cloning theorem Wootters & Zurek [1982], Eve
cannot copy unknown quantum states. Based on these two principles, Bennett
and Brassard in 1984 came up with their BB84 protocol in which single photons
were carrying the key-bit information from Alice to Bob Bennett [1984]. Over
the time, more practical protocols have been developed that allow us to use
weak laser pulses to approximate single-photon pulses. Nevertheless, most QKD
protocols will still rely on the few photon regime of operation, which makes them
vulnerable to loss and background noise. This will make the implementation of
QKD especially challenging in wireless mobile environments in which background
noise is strong and alignment options are limited Elmabrok & Razavi [2015],
Elmabrok et al. [2018].
In the original BB84 protocol Bennett [1984], the light source was assumed to
emit perfect single photons, but it is not the case in practice. The progress with
single-photon detectors has also been tremendous with quantum efficiencies as
high as 93% and dark counts as low as one per second are now achievable Marsili
et al. [2013]. Such developments have resulted in QKD being demonstrated over
both optical fiber and free-space channels Korzh et al. [2015] Schmitt-Manderbach
et al. [2007]. Today, various QKD systems are also commercially available. Ex-
amples are Clavis by ID Quantique in Switzerland idq [2010] and various products
by QuantumCTek in China Qua [2012], which contributes to the 2000-km-long
QKD link between Beijing and Shanghai. The latter is an example of QKD net-
works that are being developed across the world, in order to support a wider
group of end users. It is clear that the focus of most of these efforts is, however,
mainly on the core networks Sasaki et al. [2011], or the wired access to such a
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backbone Fro¨hlich et al. [2013]. This thesis, however, widens the QKD adoption
by looking into wireless indoor QKD.
1.3 Wireless indoor QKD
Wireless access to a communications network is often taken for granted. This is
not the case, however, for quantum communications. Most of QKD experiments
are fiber-based in which point-to-point communication is established. In addition,
the single photons enjoy traveling through a very low-loss channel. Through-the-
air QKD experiments have also been point to point, therefore not offering mobil-
ity, and often require expensive and bulky optics equipment. However, nowadays,
wireless connection is a necessity because of its convenience and also, because of
the ever increasing use of handheld devices. In order that QKD will ever become
ubiquitously used, wireless mobile QKD needs to be developed. While it is hard
to envisage, at the moment, that wireless quantum access can be offered any-
where anytime, there are certain scenarios in which wireless QKD can be both
possible and beneficial. For instance, customers in a bank office may wish to
exchange secret keys with the bank wirelessly without the need for waiting for a
teller or a cash machine, and without being worried about their data privacy due
to skimming frauds Duligall et al. [2006]. Handheld prototypes have already been
made, which enable a user to securely exchange a key with a cash machine Chun
et al. [2017], Duligall et al. [2006]. It would be desirable to remove the constraint
of being in the vicinity of a bank machine. In such a scenario, wireless indoor
QKD is an attractive solution. In the long term, such indoors solutions can be
part of a home network, which is equipped with wireless optical communications
and is connected via fiber to its main service provider Elmabrok & Razavi [2016].
This is in line with the developing Li-Fi technologies in data communications
connected to passive optical networks (PONs) for high data rate transmissions.
Our proposed wireless QKD link will be using the same infrastructure while com-
plementing the range of services offered to the user by adding quantum enabled
security.
Wireless indoor QKD would not be without its own implementation chal-
lenges. Such a system is expected to suffer from the background noise, loss, and
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the implications of the mobility requirement. Ambient light, caused by the sun
and artificial sources of light, is the primary hindrance to the successful operation
of QKD in indoor environments. Essentially, QKD is a noise-dependent scheme,
in which a secret key cannot be exchanged when the noise level exceeds a cer-
tain level. Another possible downside of indoor environments is the existence of
severe loss, in comparison to fiber-based QKD, when the transmitted beam angle
is wide. For instance, the non-directed line-of-sight configuration, which suits
most a mobile user, would suffer most from the background noise and loss. This
is because, in this configuration, the receiver’s field of view (FOV) should be suf-
ficiently wide in order to collect sufficient power to operate. This could result in
more background noise to sneak in. A wide beam angle at the transmitter would
also result in a high channel loss, which may not be tolerable in the single-photon
regime that QKD must operate. Beam steering could be a possible solution to
such problems, but it would add to the complexity of the system and the cost of
handheld devices.
Wireless indoor QKD is an interesting solution aiming to facilitate the access
to the QKD networks, where the range is limited as in the case of PONs. Long
distance wireless QKD can, however, be achieved using satellite-based QKD. The
latter is one of the most interesting applications of free-space QKD. In this case,
secure keys are being exchanged between a ground station, typically consists of
a large-size telescope (diameter on the order of 1 m) and accurate tracking and
pointing systems, and a satellite typically on the low-earth orbit. Such a setup
can enable key exchange between two ground stations via a satellite, possibly far
away by thousands of kilometres Liao et al. [2018]. This would help in providing
a global network where secure data exchange is guaranteed. Our work on an
indoor setup is a pre-cursor to a large-scale satellite network as one can simulate
some aspects of satellite communications in an indoor setup under controlled
conditions.
1.4 Research objectives and challenges
We aim to enable users equipped with a QKD-enabled mobile device in indoor
environments to access a hybrid quantum-classical network. This would help end
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users to exchange quantum and classical data with service providers. However
challenging, embedding QKD capability into mobile/handheld devices is an at-
tractive solution for exchanging sensitive data in a safe and convenient manner.
Initial prototypes have already been made, which enable a handheld device to ex-
change secret keys with an ATM without being affected by skimming frauds Chun
et al. [2017], Duligall et al. [2006]. As another application, it would be desirable to
enable a user working in a public space, such as an airport or a cafe, to exchange
secret keys with its service provider via possibly untrusted nodes. Similarly, once
fiber-to-the-home infrastructure is widely available, home users should benefit
from such wireless links that connect them, via a PON, to other service provider
nodes. In this case, the connection to the PON can be via an internal QKD node
trusted by the user. Note that, in all cases above, we are dealing with a wireless
link in an indoor environment, which may offer certain advantages, as compared
to a general outdoor setup, in terms of ease of implementation. It is, nevertheless,
a good starting point for offering wireless QKD services as we study here.
In this thesis, we first assess the feasibility of employing QKD in indoor en-
vironments by using the known techniques in OWC. This is done for QKD in
a single-room single-user scenario. Multiple users can also be supported by us-
ing relevant multiple-access techniques Razavi [2012] Bahrani et al. [2015]. The
system is mainly examined in the presence of background noise induced by an
artificial lighting source, as well as the loss in indoor environments. We also
account for possible imperfections in the encoder and decoder modules. After
assessing the applicability, we propose practical configurations of trusted and un-
trusted links, that would enable wireless access to QKD networks. The proposed
setups require hybrid links on which both data and quantum signals can travel in
both wireless and wired modes. A QKD system run on such a hybrid quantum-
classical link would then face certain challenges. First, the background light in
the wireless environment can sneak into the fiber system and increase error rates
of the QKD setup. Furthermore, due to nonlinear effects in optical fibers such as
four-wave mixing and Raman scattering Eraerds et al. [2010], the data channels
that travel alongside QKD channels on the same fiber can induce additional back-
ground noise on QKD systems. In particular, the impact of the Raman scattered
light can be severe Eraerds et al. [2010], because its spectrum can overlap with
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the frequency band of QKD channels. By using extensive filtering in time and fre-
quency domains, the impact of this noise can be mitigated Bahrani et al. [2016a],
Patel et al. [2012, 2014b] and even maximally reduced Bahrani et al. [2016b], but
it cannot be fully suppressed. By considering various sources of noise, four setups
for embedding wireless indoor QKD links into quantum-classical access networks
are then investigated. In each case, we find the corresponding key generation rate
for relevant QKD protocols. We use the decoy state BB84 (DS-BB84) Ma et al.
[2005], which relies on weak laser pulses, and measurement-device-independent
QKD (MDI-QKD) Lo et al. [2012] protocols in our setups. MDI-QKD protocol
can provide a trust-free link, as required in the case of a user in a public space,
between the wireless user and the central office in an access network. The price to
pay, however, is possible reduction in the rate. We also consider the GG02 pro-
tocol Grosshans & Grangier [2002], as a continuous-variable (CV) QKD scheme,
and compare it with our discrete-variable (DV) protocols in terms of resilience
to background noise and loss Kumar et al. [2014], Lasota et al. [2017]. In our
analysis, we consider the asymptotic case, as well as the finite size scenario.
1.5 Novel contributions of the thesis
• We find a practical regime of operation for wireless QKD in indoor envir-
onments.
• We study the feasibility in different scenarios for the QKD source and re-
ceiver. Some results were presented in IEEE GLOBECOM 2015 Elmabrok
& Razavi [2015].
• In the analysis, we estimate the background noise caused by a LED lighting
source. We consider different scenarios where the QKD source is perfect or
with known/unknown flaws. The results are published in Elmabrok et al.
[2018].
• We examine embedding wireless indoor QKD in hybrid quantum-classical
networks. We propose practical configurations that would enable wireless
access to such networks Elmabrok & Razavi [2016, 2018].
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• We assess the performance in practical scenarios where a finite size of data
is assumed to be exchanged between two legitimate users.
1.6 Thesis outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows:
• In Chapter 2, we review relevant QKD techniques. We first introduce the
principal properties of quantum mechanics and the key ideas behind QKD.
Next, the DV (CV) QKD protocols being used in our study, will be ex-
plained.
• In Chapter 3, optical wireless communications is discussed. We provide
the model and configuration used to characterise the channel in indoor
environments.
• In Chapter 4, we present and discuss the feasibility aspects of wireless indoor
QKD.
• In Chapter 5, we present and discuss the proposed configurations that would
enable a convenient access to QKD networks.
• In Chapter 6, we present and discuss the finite-key analysis for wireless
indoor QKD.
• In Chapter 7, the conclusions and future work are presented.
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Chapter 2
Quantum key distribution
2.1 Introduction
The field of quantum information science has received much attention in recent
years for its applications in cryptography. In particular, QKD, which is realizable
today idq [2010] Qua [2012], has the capacity to generate perfect security in data
exchange between parties. Since Bennett and Brassard introduced the BB84
scheme Bennett [1984], several QKD protocols have been presented, and the
experimental implementation phase was the driver for many manufacturers to
make QKD commercially available. Fortunately, quantum security systems are
compatible with the standard optical networks as the main infrastructure in use.
To date, a number of QKD protocols have been introduced and implemented over
optical fibre or through free space, which could make QKD a strong competitor to
classical cryptography in the future, due to its unconditional security. However,
certain aspects such as rate and range, need to be enhanced before a full industrial
deployment. Thus, significant efforts are being made to improve the key rate and
to produce suitable devices for quantum cryptography.
The security of QKD has already been proven and remarkable experiments
have illustrated the possibility of applying it in the real world Korzh et al.
[2015] Schmitt-Manderbach et al. [2007]. QKD through free space is applic-
able, provided a line-of-sight link between the transmitter and the receiver is
established. In contrast to fibre-based QKD, where standard telecommunication
wavelengths are used, wavelengths in the range of 780-880 nm can also be utilized
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in atmospheric links rates. One of the interesting applications of free space-QKD
is a key exchange between two ground stations via a satellite. For instance, in this
scheme, a telescope on one of those ground stations receives polarized light pulses
from a sender on a satellite to exchange a secret key, K1. Correspondingly, the
same scenario would be applied for the second ground station to obtain K2. The
satellite can then securely send K1 to the second ground station by encrypting it
using K2. This can be done by performing bitwise XOR operation K1 ⊕K2= C
and sending C to the ground station. Air turbulence is one of the problems that
reduces the effective reception of the telescopes. In this case, a large telescope is
used to collect as many of attenuated pulses as possible Prawer & Aharonovich
[2014]. In 2007, the idea of a decoy state was implemented over 144 km between
stations in the Canary Islands of Tenerife and La Palma Schmitt-Manderbach
et al. [2007]. Similarly the Zeilinger Group, at the University of Vienna, achieved
the same distance of 144 km by sending entangled photons instead Ursin et al.
[2006].
While quantum optical fundamentals are generally the same as free space,
fibre based-QKD uses the standard telecommunication wavelengths (1300 and
1550) nm instead. The downside of employing such wavelengths is the high noise
and low efficiency of some of the currently used single photon detectors Prawer &
Aharonovich [2014]. Recent developments of superconducting detectors has led a
group from the University of Geneva to implement QKD over a distance of 307 km
Korzh et al. [2015]. Interestingly, for the sake of future long-distance quantum
communications, research is being conducted to develop quantum repeaters. This
is because of the fiber loss that would result in limiting the transmission distances,
as well as the secret key rates. Such repeaters rely on transmitting entangled
quantum states between the repeater nodes. Satellite links could be used altern-
atively in order to have long-distance quantum communications, but this solution
might be costly in comparison with optical links using quantum repeaters. Here,
our focus is on the access network and how different QKD protocols and settings
would adapt themselves into wireless indoor QKD.
QKD systems are classified by modulation into two main approaches, that is,
discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD) and continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD) Scarani
et al. [2009]. In DV-QKD, the key distribution is achieved by utilizing certain
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degrees of freedom of light, that are discrete in nature, whereas in CV-QKD, it
is accomplished by exploiting continuous ones. For instance in DV-QKD, the
information can be encoded using the polarization of single photons. In contrast,
CV-QKD encodes data by modifying the electric field quadrature amplitudes, Xˆ
and Pˆ . At the receiver, DV-QKD requires single-photon detectors to measure the
received quantum states, whereas in CV-QKD protocols, coherent receivers, such
as homodyne and heterodyne are in use. In this work, DV-QKD and CV-QKD
protocols will be studied to draw a clear comparison about the feasibility and
performance of different protocols. QKD systems are also classified by source
into prepare and measure (P&M), which is assumed to be used in this study,
and entanglement based. In P&M, the sender prepares quantum states using
one of the encoding techniques, and send them to the recipient, who performs
the measurement. In entanglement based KD, however, both users, perform the
measurement, but the sender could be Alice or a third party.
In the following, in order to explain how QKD works, we first highlight, in
short, the fundamentals of quantum mechanics and the relevant notions to QKD.
Next, the key ideas behind QKD will be presented, and finally, the used DV(CV)-
QKD protocols in this work are explained.
2.2 Quantum mechanics: fundamental concepts
Quantum mechanics is a mathematical framework that describes and explains the
behaviour of quantum systems, such as electrons and photons. A quantum system
is completely described by its state space, which provides all possible states of
the system. In quantum mechanics, the state of a quantum object, such as the
polarisation of a photon, is described by a vector in a complex vector space known
as a Hilbert space. A qubit represents the simplest state in quantum information.
QKD relys on intrinsic properties of quantum mechanics, such as superposition,
uncertainty, and non-cloning theorem. For instance, the latter theorem states
that unknown quantum states cannot be cloned perfectly. It would be possible,
however, to make copies of a quantum state if you prepare a quantum object
in a particular state. In quantum physics, entanglement is a special kind of
correlation that exists between two quantum systems. This feature is crucial in
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certain QKD schemes. In the following, some important concepts related to QKD
are explained.
2.2.1 Qubit
In classical computing theory, the bit is the basic unit of information, which
has two possible values of 0 or 1. Qubit is the corresponding unit in quantum
information that is expressed by states |0〉 and |1〉 or a superposition of them as
shown below:
|ψ〉 = α|0〉+ β|1〉, (2.1)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are called the computational basis states. α and β are complex
amplitudes satisfying the normalization condition Nielsen & Chuang [2002]:
|α|2 + |β|2 = 1. (2.2)
A qubit state can then be defined as a unit vector in a two dimensional
complex vector space. In (2.2), |α|2 represents the probability of finding |ψ〉 in
|0〉 if a measurement in |0〉−|1〉 basis is performed. |β|2 represents the probability
of finding |ψ〉 in state |1〉 upon such measurements.
Polarisation and time-bin of a single photon could be used to create a qubit in
DV-QKD for information encoding. In time-bin degree of freedom, for instance,
the photon generated by the source, is split into two time slots using an unbal-
anced interferometer, and sent to the recipient; see Fig. 2.1. The phase difference
between the two slots can also be used to encode/decode the information.
2.2.2 Superposition and the measurement principle
The concept of quantum superposition is commonly explained by the ”Schrodinger’s
cat” as shown in Fig. 2.2, where the cat may be alive and dead at the same time
before opening the box in case of breaking a flask of poison. Quantum systems
can similarly exist in a superposition (linear combination) of states, in which a
measurement would cause a state to be collapsed into a single state with a certain
probability.
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Figure 2.1: Time slot implementation of a qubit. BS: beamsplitter Diamanti
[2006]. The photon can be either in time slot t1 or t2.
Figure 2.2: Schrodinger’s Cat represents the concept of quantum superposition.
We cannot be sure whether it is alive or dead before opening the box in case of
breaking a flask of poison.
For instance, one manifestation of (2.1) is the polarisation state of a single
photon, which can be described as follows:
|ψ〉 = α|H〉+ β|V 〉, (2.3)
where |H〉 (|V 〉) represents a single photon with horizontal (vertical) polariza-
tion. In this case, if we measure it using a polarising beam splitter followed by
single photon detectors, the state would collapse either to H or V depending on
which detector clicks, as shown in Fig 2.3. In the particular case of a diagonal
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Figure 2.3: The quantum state |ψ〉 would collapse either to |H〉 or |V 〉 depending
to which detector clicks.
polarization (+45 or -45),
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|H〉 ± |V 〉), (2.4)
it is equally likely to get |H〉 or |V 〉 in the above measurement.
The measurement principle plays a fundamental role in quantum crypto-
graphy. It states that, if a measurement is carried out at the quantum level,
it can change the state of the observed particle in an irreversible way. For in-
stance, in the case of the state in (2.4), the result of H-V measurement does
not reveal the initial state. In QKD, after performing the measurement by Bob,
the quantum states sent by Alice will be converted to classical bits after the
distillation process. Such bits can then be used for secure communication and
authentication tasks.
2.2.3 Uncertainty principle
Uncertainty principle, also called Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, states that
there is an uncertainty relation between two observables such as position and
momentum. It means that if one of the observables is measured, the measurement
outcome of the second observable would be affected. The product of uncertainties
of two observables, such as the position and momentum, can always be at a certain
limit: ∆x∆y > }2 . In QKD, particularly in CV-QKD, this principle is essential
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in ensuring the security, since Eve cannot precisely measure both quadratures,
Xˆ, Pˆ , simultaneously.
2.2.4 Entanglement
Entanglement is an interesting feature in quantum mechanics where particles can
be correlated in some way that yields correlation between their measurement
outcomes. This remarkable property was exploited by Ekert to introduce E91
protocol Ekert [1991]. Assume that, we have two single photons, labelled 1 and
2 , and they are in the following state:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
[|H〉1|H〉2 + |V 〉1|V 〉2]. (2.5)
In (2.5), if we measure the polarization of the first photon, the result would
be H or V. Suppose that the result is horizontal; then the collapsed state of the
system would be:
|ψ〉 = |H〉1|H〉2. (2.6)
Even though we measure just the first photon, the second photon will have
the same state in this case, so we say that the two photons are entangled, in
which a measurement on one affects the other. A nonlinear optical material is
used to generate entangled photons using the process of spontaneous Parametric
Down Conversion (SPDC).
2.3 QKD key ideas
The basic structure of a QKD system is generally similar to an optical communic-
ation system, which means that it needs a light source, such as a laser diode, an
optical channel, and a photodetector at the receiver. Yet with QKD, since we deal
primarily with single photons, this would often necessitate a single photon source
and a single-photon detector. In DV-QKD systems, single-photon detectors are
necessary in comparison with CV-QKD. In the following, a brief description is
provided about QKD source, QKD receiver, and the channel types in QKD. In
addition, we define quantum bit error rate (QBER) and the role of Eve.
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2.3.1 QKD source
Ideally, it is assumed that QKD source would emit single photons, however, the
actual source in real-life QKD is the highly attenuated laser. Such an imperfect
single photon source produces weak coherent states. In quantum mechanics,
quantum harmonic oscillator has a specific state, called coherent state. This
state resembles a classical light field, as it has relatively well-defined amplitude
and phase with minimum fluctuations. Coherent states follow a Poisson photon
number distribution:
p(n) = µ
n
n! e
−µ, (2.7)
where µ is the mean number of photons in a time period τ . For instance, if µ=0.5,
the probability of detecting a single photon, p(n = 1), in a pulse with width τ , is
0.3.
2.3.2 QKD receiver
A single-photon detector at the QKD receiver is required in DV-QKD, whereas in
CV-QKD an ordinary photodetctor is used. This is because the detection in CV-
QKD is based on measuring the field quadratures, Xˆ and Pˆ , using homodyne or
heterodyne receivers, rather than measuring the quantized intensity in DV-QKD.
In single-photon detectors, the background noise has an adverse impact on
the system performance, as it increases the error probability. One source of back-
ground noise is detector’s dark current, whereby the detector tends to click despite
the absence of light. The dark count rate (γdc), which is an intrinsic property of
the detector, varies from one detector to another. For instance, it ranges from
(100-1000)/s for an APD, to (1-100)/s for superconducting detectors Dusek et al.
[2006]. The average dark count nD over a period τ is: γdc.τ .
While DV-QKD requires single-photon detectors, CV-QKD protocols are com-
patible with standard telecommunication technologies for coherent optical com-
munications, namely, that of homodyne and heterodyne receivers Diamanti &
Leverrier [2015]. CV-QKD has also, in certain regimes, the possible advantage
of being more resilient to the background noise induced in WDM networks than
DV-QKD Qi et al. [2010a]. This is due to the intrinsic filtration of photons that
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Figure 2.4: In QKD, an insecure quantum channel for exchanging quntum states
and an authenticated classical channel for achieving error correction and privacy
amplification. Eve attacks the quantum layer Imre & Gyongyosi [2012].
do not match the spatio-temporal and polarization mode of the local oscillator
(LO) in homodyne receivers Kumar et al. [2014].
2.3.3 QKD channel
QKD is carried out over an insecure quantum channel and an authenticated
classical channel; see Fig 2.4. The former could be free space or an optical
fiber, in order to exchange quantum states, such as polarized single photons.
The latter channel, which could be a telephone line, the internet, or any other
classical channels, is employed for post processing steps. After such steps, we
ensure achieving perfectly secret key at the expense of shortening the key rate.
In Fig 2.4, Eve, the eavesdropper, tries to gain information about the key. In
general, the channel distance in QKD is limited due to the loss, as the carriers
are single photons, which have a low chance to survive over long distances.
2.3.4 Quantum bit error rate (QBER)
In QKD protocols, particularly in discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD), QBER
refers to the error probability in the remaining keys distributed between Alice
and Bob through a quantum channel. The remaining bits, which called the sifted
keys, are resulted after reconciling the used bases between the two parties, and
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discarding the lost photons. QBER is a crucial quantity, since it allows both
parties to decide whether to continue further to the post processing step or to
abort the protocol in case Eve has gained more information about the key than
Bob. QBER represents the discrepancy between the sifted keys and is given by:
QBER = false counts
total counts
, (2.8)
where total counts is the total number of sifted key bits, and false counts is the
number of incorrect sifted key bits between Alice and Bob. The presence of Eve
in DV-QKD schemes can typically be discovered if the QBER exceed a certain
limit. In CV-QKD, however, channel loss and excess noise are essential quantities
to characterise the quantum channel in this context.
2.3.5 Eve’s role
Eve has an adversary role, in which she attempts to interfere and gain information
about the key throughout the process of key generation. She is assumed to have
unlimited computational power only bound by quantum mechanical laws, which
gives her the ability to intercept the quantum channel. In order to clarify how
Eve intercepts the link between Alice and Bob, we explain the intercept and
resend attack. Suppose that Alice sends a horizontally polarized photon and
Bob employs a linear basis (H/V) for measurement. As for Eve, she would use
either a rectilinear or a diagonal basis to make the measurements. Whatever she
measures, she will resend to Bob. If Eve utilizes a linear polarizer, she would
obtain an exact result as Bob, in which case, Bob cannot realize her presence.
On the other hand, if Eve measures using the diagonal basis, there would be 50%
chance to get |+45〉 or |−45〉 state. Accordingly, Bob would get an equally likely
outcome of a horizontal or a vertical polarization. Therefore, the average error
rate over the link is 25% Dusek et al. [2006].
If Alice and Bob observe such a high amount of error, they should abort the
protocol and start over. Since it is not possible for Eve to attack the quantum
channel and distinguish between non-orthogonal states without perturbing the
channel, the security of QKD system is guaranteed. In addition to the above
attack, there are other types of attacks that Eve can perform. These include
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(a) probing attacks, where Eve can collect information from both parties, Alice
and Bob, by attacking equipment directly. In particular, using a probe, she can
emit light into receiver/transmitter boxes and collect back the reflected signal;
(b) Side-channel attacks, in which case, Eve can collect the leaked information
from devices Jain et al. [2016].
2.4 Discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD)
In DV-QKD protocols, discrete degrees of freedom of optical signals are exploited
to encode each bit of secret information. One fundamental QKD protocols that
uses such an encoding is the BB84 protocol, in which the polarization of single
photons is used to generate a secret key between two intended parties. In the
following, we first introduce the standard BB84 protocol, as it shows generally
how QKD protocols work. Then, we present other important DV-QKD protocols
considered in our analysis, namely, decoy-state BB84, reference frame independ-
ent quantum key distribution (RFI-QKD), and measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD).
2.4.1 The standard BB84 protocol
In 1984, Bennett and Brassard invented BB84, which is the first QKD pro-
tocol Bennett [1984]. Later, within a few years, a practical demonstration was
conducted at IBM, yet the transmission distance was only 32 cm Bennett et al.
[1992a]. In the standard BB84 protocol, the polarization of single photons is used
to generate a secret key between two intended parties. The protocol, see Fig. 2.6,
is illustrated in the following steps:
Raw key generation
Firstly, Alice creates a random a sequence of bits, each of which is encoded in the
so-called Z-basis (H, V polarisation) or, the X-basis (+45◦, −45◦ polarisation);
see Fig. 2.5. The encoding basis is changed randomly during qubit transmission.
She transmits the polarized photons or qubits over a quantum channel to the
recipient. On the reception side, Bob selects randomly one of the two bases to
20
2.4 Discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD)
Figure 2.5: A schematic view of polarisation encoding in BB84 protocol. PR:
Polarization Rotator.PBS: Polarizing Beamsplitter.
measure and record the corresponding binary string of bits Dusek et al. [2006]. He
uses single photon detectors in order to convert the received pulses into electronic
ones for the next classical processing step.
Sifted key
If the two bases are chosen equally likely, there is a 50% probability that the
bases chosen by Alice and Bob will be nonidentical. Therefore 50% of the key
bits would be discarded due to basis mismatching. In addition, some photons
might have not reached the receiver. The remaining sequence of bits constitute
the sifted key.
Error correction
The post processing step consists of error correction and privacy Amplification.
Such steps would result in distilling a secure key provided that the quantum
noise has not exceeded a specific limit. In order to obtain an identical secure
key between Alice and Bob, we need to carry out an error correction process to
get rid of any errors due to the noise in the quantum channel and/or because of
Eve’s intrusion. Alice and Bob reveal a chosen subset of n bits from the sifted key
and/or perform parity comparisons to estimate the amount of errors. In some
cases, if the error exceeds a certain threshold, they would decide to abort the
protocol and start a new session; otherwise they carry on with the error-correction
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Figure 2.6: The two phases of the BB84 protocol Lu¨tkenhaus [2007].
procedure until obtaining an identical sequence of bits on both sides Bhandari
[2014].
Privacy amplification
Even though the objective of error correction is to obtain an identical stream
of bits between Alice and Bob, privacy amplification is needed to prevent any
possibility for Eve to gain any information about the key. In general, privacy
amplification is performed by using appropriate hashing functions, in which the
input stream will be shortened according to a proper factor Lu¨tkenhaus [2007].
2.4.2 The decoy-state BB84 protocol
In the ideal scenario of the BB84 protocol Bennett [1984], explained in 2.4.1, it
is assumed that Alice, the sender, uses a single-photon source. However, this is
not necessarily the case in practice. The actual alternative source is a highly at-
tenuated laser that produces weak coherent states, as mentioned previously. The
problem with using such sources is the possibility of experiencing the photon-
number-splitting (PNS) attack Brassard et al. [2000] as each pulse might con-
tain more than one photon. That is, Eve can siphon a photon and forward the
rest to Bob. Later, after public announcement of the bases by Alice and Bob,
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Eve can measure exactly the state of the photon without revealing her presence.
The decoy-state (DS) technique Ma et al. [2005], which was proposed first by
Hwang Hwang [2003], beats this kind of attack. The idea is to use several dif-
ferent light intensities, instead of one, so that any attempts by Eve to intrude
on the link is more likely to be detected. This helps to gather more information
from the quantum channel in order to discover the presence of Eve. The secur-
ity analysis of PNS loophole due to device imperfections in real-life QKD, was
originally considered by Gottesman-Lo-Lu¨tkenhaus-Preskill (GLLP) Gottesman
et al. [2004]. However, the obtained key rate and secure transmission distance
are limited Ma [2006]. The decoy-state method Ma et al. [2005] was proposed
to tackle effectively the limitations in GLLP analysis. Decoy-state QKD can ac-
complish a higher key generation rate, in comparison with non-decoy protocols,
in addition of improving the transmission distances Ma [2008], Ma et al. [2005].
In the decoy-state technique the transmission of both signal and decoy states
between Alice and Bob would help to estimate the quantum channel parameters.
The signal states are used to generate the secret keys, while the objective of
the decoy signals is to characterize the quantum channel Zhang et al. [2017b].
Roughly speaking, as compared to the signal pulses, decoy pulses often have a
lower multi-photon component, due to having a lower average number of photon
per pulse as compared to the signal pulses. In this case, if Eve launches the PNS
attack, Bob would receive a different portion of decoy pulses than signal pulses.
As a result, if Alice and Bob examine separately both the decoy and signal pulses,
the attack can be detected.
The issue of eavesdropping is a matter of whether we can detect Eve or not.
If Eve uses PNS attacks, the estimated value of the error rate in single-photon
states, e1, and QBER, could be so high that no secret key can be generated.
The important thing about decoy states is that they enable us to accurately
estimate the single-photon gain, Q1, and e1. If we use only one intensity, we
cannot properly estimate these parameters, but with multiple decoy states, we
can better estimate their values. Knowing e1 and Q1 becomes important at the
privacy amplification stage, as it turns out that we can get a secure key only from
those key bits that have been generated from single photon components at the
source.
23
2.4 Discrete variable QKD (DV-QKD)
In our key-rate analysis, we use the efficient version of DS-BB84 Lo et al.
[2005], where Z basis is chosen more frequently than the X basis. We also as-
sume that time-bin encoding is in use. In such an encoding approach, time slot
implementations are used; see Fig 2.1. The information is encoded in the relative
phase of the two time slots. The modes can then be defined corresponding to the
two time slots, t1 and t2. After the unbalanced interferometer, the qubit state
can then be written as Diamanti [2006]:
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|t1〉+ eiα |t2〉). (2.9)
In Fig. 2.1, at Bob receiver’s, the two pulses would interfere with each other
at t2, which is the detection timeslot. By changing the phase shift φ, the meas-
urement can be performed in any desired basis. The results will be identified
according to which detector has clicked. In this encoding, the Z basis is spanned
by the single-photon states corresponding to each time-bin, whereas the X eigen-
bases are the superposition of such states. In Appendix A, the lower bound for
the key generation rate in the limit of an infinitely long key Ma et al. [2005], is
explained.
2.4.3 The reference frame independent-quantum key dis-
tribution (RFI-QKD) protocol
In most QKD schemes, two remote users have to share a reference frame to align
their used bases Liang et al. [2014]. This alignment is performed actively over
a classical channel Sheridan et al. [2010]. For instance, QKD systems that use
polarization encoding techniques must maintain the alignment of polarized states
between Alice and Bob. Such an indispensable alignment would require extra cost
and time to be performed Liang et al. [2014]. RFI-QKD protocol was proposed by
Laing et al Laing et al. [2010a] to break such a restriction. The idea of RFI-QKD
was originally about how to maintain the state of linearly polarized qubits that
sent by mobile devices equipped with QKD Wabnig et al. [2013]. In RFI-QKD
protocol, two users employ three bases for qubits encoding. In this case, only one
basis should be well-aligned between users for secret key generation, while the
other two bases are used for channel characterization Laing et al. [2010a].
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There are another proposed ideas to address the issue of reference frame mis-
alignment. For example, qubits can be encoded within larger systems, in which
many entangled photons are necessitated Bartlett et al. [2003], Zhang et al. [2014].
However, this poses a technical challenge in terms of generation, manipulation,
and detection Zhang et al. [2014]. Another alternative solution is by utilizing
spatial modes of light for encoding information Spedalieri [2006]. This may be
functional through wireless communication, but due to mode dispersion, trans-
mitted modes would be affected when sent over fiber Zhang et al. [2014]. Plug-
and-play system is another possibility, such a system is used to compensate the
polarization deviation. This is performed by sending the received light pulse in
backward and forward directions over the same fiber. This is achieved by using
Faraday mirror in order to to cancel out the birefringence Muller et al. [1997],
Zhang et al. [2014]. A downside to this system is the possibility that error rate
is increased due to Rayleigh backscattering Zhang et al. [2014].
RFI-QKD protocol, in particular, is practical in cases where the alignment of
reference frames between remote parties is not observed and may vary in time La-
ing et al. [2010a]. In this protocol, Bob receives a qubit that prepared in an
eigenstate of three orthogonal bases X, Y , and Z, which chosen randomly by
Alice Laing et al. [2010a]Sheridan et al. [2010]. Z basis is supposed to be well
aligned, i.e., ZA = ZB, for acquiring the raw key. X and Y bases, in contrast,
are used to bound Eve’s information assuming that they vary slowly with time
so that they can be assumed fixed for one round of QKD operation Zhang et al.
[2014]. After the measurement outcomes are announced over a public channel,
Alice and Bob follow the typical sifting and post processing procedures to come
up with a shared secret key. The estimated key generation rate for RFI-QKD
with decoy-state technique is given in Appendix B. We assume that the efficient
version of DS-BB84 is in use.
2.4.4 The measurement device independent-quantum key
distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol
QKD schemes are not perfect in practice, and this would encourage Eve to do
some interception activities. In practical QKD systems, even without launching
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any attacks on the quantum channel or the users’ devices, Eve can still obtain
information about the key by exploiting the leaked information from Alice and
Bob devices Jain et al. [2016]. As a result, neither user would be able to dis-
cover the presence of Eve. Such a scenario is called side-channel attack Jaina
et al. [2015]. Device-independent QKD (DI-QKD) Mayers & Yao [1998] was pro-
posed as a solution to such a loophole of security. With certain assumptions,
the devices of Alice and Bob are described as ”black boxes”, which means that
neither parties require to know the way their devices work Xu et al. [2015]. One
possible downside of DI-QKD is , however, its low key generation rate on the or-
der of 10−10 over practical distances Curty & Moroder [2011], Gisin et al. [2010],
Xu et al. [2015]. Interestingly, the MDI-QKD protocol Lo et al. [2012] provides
an alternative solution to remove all detector side-channel attacks. This pro-
tocol can enhance the performance in comparison with DI-QKD. In MDI-QKD,
the measurement is performed by a third party, Charlie, who is not necessarily
trusted. In such a protocol, Charlie performs a Bell-state measurement (BSM)
on Alice and Bob’s signals. The security of MDI-QKD protocol is based on the
reverse-EPR protocol Biham et al. [1996].
In the original MDI-QKD protocol Lo et al. [2012], in each QKD transmitter
at Alice and Bob, weak coherent pulses (WCPs) are randomly encoded to dif-
ferent BB84 polarization states by using a polarization modulator. Decoy states
generated by an intensity modulator and signals are then sent by both parties
to the QKD receiver, where BSM module is located; see Fig. 2.7. This essential
module consists of a 50:50 beam splitter (BS), where the signals from Alice and
Bob are interfered. BS is followed by a polarizing beam splitter (PBS) in order to
project the incoming photons into a horizontal (H) or a vertical (V) polarizations
states Lo et al. [2012].
In our study, however, we assume that both users have a DS-BB84 time-bin
encoder Ma & Razavi [2012], Ma et al. [2012b]. We also again assume that the
efficient version of DS-BB84 is in use. After Charlie announces the measurement
outcomes of the successful events over a public channel, Alice and Bob follow the
typical sifting and post processing procedures to come up with a shared secret
key.
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Figure 2.7: a Bell-state measurement (BSM) on Alice and Bob’s signals.
2.5 Continuous variable QKD (CV-QKD): GG02
protocol
Amplitude and phase quadratures of the electric field, Xˆ and Pˆ , are noncom-
muting variables used for encoding in CV-QKD. These quadratures describe the
real and imaginary parts of the complex amplitude, aˆ, and they are given by:
Xˆ = 1√2(aˆ
† + aˆ), and Pˆ = 1√2(aˆ
† − aˆ). In CV-QKD, Alice encodes the bits to be
distributed by specifying such quadrature amplitudes in a coherent state. At the
receiver, Bob would measure one of the quadratures, or both, using coherent re-
ceivers, such as homodyne or heterodyne. CV-QKD, as mentioned previously, is
more tolerable to the background noise induced in WDM networks than DV-QKD
due to the mode selectivity of the local oscillator (LO) in homodyne receivers.
However, for secure communication, CV-QKD may only be practical for short
distances in comparison with DV-QKD Jouguet et al. [2013], Lodewyck et al.
[2007]. This is because of the excess noise and loss in the optical channels, as
well as the limited efficiency of the classical reconciliation Madsen et al. [2012].
In our analysis, we consider GG02 as a CV-QKD protocol, in order to draw a
clear comparison with DV-QKD protocols.
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The GG02 protocol is introduced by Grosshans and Grangier Grosshans &
Grangier [2002]. It is the counterpart of the BB84 protocol in the CV prepare
and measure schemes. In contrast to BB84, which relies on discrete variables,
such as the polarization of single photons, GG02 exploits the quadratures of
coherent states for encoding the information. In GG02, two random numbers,
XA and PA are drawn by Alice according to two independent zero-mean Gaussian
distributions with variance VA, in shot noise unit. The coherent state |XA + iPA〉
is then prepared, using amplitude and phase modulators, by Alice and sent to
Bob, who randomly measures one of the two quadratures. After this stage both
users acquire correlated random data. The error reconciliation and the privacy
amplification are then performed in order to obtain the final secure key Grosshans
& Grangier [2002]. We assume here that reverse reconciliation Grosshans et al.
[2003] is in use.
2.6 Summary
An overview of the key ideas in QKD was presented, starting from the fun-
damental concepts in quantum mechanics, through to the basic QKD protocols.
This includes a description of the encoding techniques in QKD, namely, DV-QKD
and CV-QKD. In the following chapter, we review optical wireless communica-
tions, in which channel modelling and link configurations are described.
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Optical wireless communications
3.1 Introduction
The advantages of wireless technologies are not restricted to mobility and flex-
ibility for users’ terminals. Users can also gain noticeable reductions in cost
and time in many applications Ramirez-Iniguez et al. [2008]. With respect to
optical wireless communications (OWC), since Gfeller and Bapst proposed this
significant technology in 1979, its implementations have spread to become avail-
able in homes and offices, starting from TV remote controls all the way to the
modern personal devices Qazi [2006]. Although infrared is commonly used for
indoor wireless communications, other transmission bands like visible spectrum
can also be utilized. This is why the technology is generally called wireless op-
tical communications” rather than wireless infrared communications Carruthers
[2003]. Indoor OWC has had great development recently, especially in the visible
light regime communications where lighting sources, for example LEDs, can be
exploited for data transmission; nevertheless, infrared applications are still the
predominant choice.
Due to its remarkable properties such as high bandwidth, unlicensed spec-
trum, low cost, easy implementation, and being free of interference, OWC is
becoming an interesting alternative means to the radio frequency (RF) for short
ranges Ghassemlooy et al. [2012]. In fact, radio and infrared are considered com-
plementary to each other instead of being presented as competitive carriers, which
can be clearly seen in the availability of bandwidth Ghassemlooy & Hayes [2003].
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Ambient noise and multipath dispersion are the major causes for degrading the
signal quality in indoor environments, consequently limiting the high data rates.
This implies that, a system design is a key point especially in terms of select-
ing an appropriate link configuration and a modulation technique, in addition
to using a suitable light source and a photodetector. QKD is expected to be a
good choice in terms of data security for indoor optical wireless communications.
This combination of classical and quantum systems has not been studied yet, and
clearly, the feasibility of the implementation would be a great challenge due to
the ambient noise in indoor environment.
In the following, we first describe OWC channels in terms of time and fre-
quency responses. Next, the categories of OWC links are explained based on the
degree of directionality and the propagation method between the sender and the
recipient. Finally, channel modelling in OWC and background are presented.
3.2 Indoor optical wireless channels
The structure of optical wireless communication schemes is generally similar to
an optical communication system. It consists of an optical emitter, free space or
air as the channel, and an optical receiver. Light emitting diodes (LEDs) or laser
diodes (LDs) are typically used as light sources, by which the electrical signal
is converted into an optical signal, and then lenses are used for beam focusing
through the medium. At the receiving side, the electrical signal is retrieved back
by a photodiode (PIN or APD), after being filtered and concentrated Elgala et al.
[2011]. It is preferable to employ wavelengths in the range of 780-950 nm, because
of the availability of cheap optoelectronic components within those bands Ma
[2008].
In practice, Intensity Modulation/Direct Detection (IM/DD) is the main
transmission approach for all indoor applications. While in RF communication
schemes, the three quantities of a carrier, i.e., the amplitude, frequency, and
phase, are modulated to convey information, in optical schemes, the intensity of
an optical carrier is commonly modulated Ghassemlooy & Hayes [2003].
The intensity of the optical power, x(t), is modulated by altering the drive
current, then at the receiver, a photocurrent, y(t), is resulted, which is classically
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Figure 3.1: Baseband model of OWC channels.
proportional to the instantaneous optical power that strikes the photodetector.
The usable frequencies’ range for most indoor optical wireless schemes extends
from DC to tens of MHz. For this reason, a baseband model is used to represent
the system; see. Fig. 3.1.
In Fig. 3.1, y(t) represents the output photoelectric current and is given by:
y(t) = Rx(t)⊗ h(t) + n(t) =
∫ ∞
−∞
Rx(τ)h(t− τ)dt+ n(t), (3.1)
where x(t) ≥ 0 is the instantaneous optical power at Tx, ⊗ : convolution, R is the
photodetector responsivity (A/W), h(t) is baseband channel impulse response,
and n(t) is the background shot noise Ghassemlooy et al. [2012].
In (3.1), h(t) is used to demonstrate the impact of multipath dispersion in
indoor OWC channel, as shown in Fig. 3.2. The frequency response of the channel
is given by:
H(f) =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(t)e−2jpiftdt. (3.2)
Infrared channels has a quite flat frequency response near DC, and so chan-
nel DC gain or H(0) is really helpful to describe the channel Kahn & Barry
[1997]. The DC gain determines the portion of the transmitted power that will
be detected at the receiver. By substituting f = 0 in (3.2), we end up with:
H(0) =
∫ ∞
−∞
h(t)dt. (3.3)
3.3 Optical link categories
In OWC, a link can be generally classified based on two criteria, firstly, the degree
of directionality between the transmitter and the receiver, and, secondly, whether
the propagation is in line of sight (LOS) or non-LOS.
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Figure 3.2: Ray representation and impulse response h(t) for multipath propaga-
tion.
3.3.1 First criterion: directionality
With respect to the directionality, by employing a directed transmitter and re-
ceiver, a link is established with benefits of superior power efficiency and lower
levels in multipath dispersion and path loss. However, it suffers from the exist-
ence of shadowing, and the limitation in the average transmitted power due to eye
safety concerns. Alternatively, if the beam angle and field of view (FOV) of the
transmitter and receiver respectively were wider, there would be a non-directed
link providing the feature of terminals’ mobility. Moreover, a hybrid configura-
tion can be accomplished by combining different degrees of directionality between
transmitters and receivers Kahn & Barry [1997].
3.3.2 Second criterion: line of sight
In LOS links, it is essential to maintain an aligned path between the sender and
recipient for data exchange with higher power efficiency, whereas in non-LOS,
the receiver depends on the reflected light from the roof, walls, or other reflective
surfaces. For non-LOS, like diffuse links, the link’s robustness is increased and
the convenience of use is enhanced. In this case, the operation can continue,
even with barriers between the sender and receiver Ghassemlooy et al. [2012].
However, this would not help in QKD operation, as we deal with single photons
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that necessitate maintaining a LOS link to be distributed between two parties
without being absorbed or lost.
3.4 Channel modelling in OWC
Mathematical models are used to approximate the behaviour of different OWC
channels where many variables are taken into account to estimate channels’ DC-
gains, and accordingly to calculate the received average power. Here, we review
how the DC for a directed LOS channel is derived using the Lambertian model.
3.4.1 Directed LOS
A directed topology tends to provide maximum efficacy at the expense of mobil-
ity restrictions. Now, the Lambertian model offers an interesting approach for
H(0) (=HDC) calculation. For the line-of-sight link between the transmitter and
receiver, the DC-gain is given by Kahn & Barry [1997]:
HDC =

A(m+1)
2pid2 cos(φ)
mTs(ψ)g(ψ) cos(ψ), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc,
0 elsewhere,
(3.4)
where d is the distance between the source and the receiver; ψ represents the
incidence angle with reference to the receiver axis, while φ specifies the irradiance
angle; see Fig. 3.3. These two parameters specify the relative location and
orientation of the transmitter and receiver modules. Ts(ψ) is the filter signal
transmission; m and g(ψ) are, respectively, the Lambert’s mode number used to
specify the directivity of the source beam and the concentrator gain, given by
m = − ln 2
ln
(
cos
(
Θ1/2
)) (3.5)
and
g(ψ) =

n2
sin2(Ψc) , 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc
0 ψ > Ψc
, (3.6)
where n is the refractive index of the concentrator, Ψc is the receiver’s FOV, and
Θ1/2 is the semi-angle at half power of the light source. We neglect here the
reflected pulses from the walls, which will arrive at a later time.
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Figure 3.3: A wireless QKD link in an indoor setup. The transmitter is mobile,
while the QKD receiver is fixed on the ceiling. For illustration purposes, the QKD
receiver is depicted away from the centre. In practice, it should be optimally
placed at the centre of the ceiling.
3.4.2 Non-directed LOS
In the case of non-directed LOS, see Fig. 3.3, the model would be slightly differ-
ent, since the reflected paths are taken into account in calculation. The portion
of this reflected light that may enter the receiver is estimated by calculating the
DC-gain for the reflected beam, HRef, off a surface element of size dA, and is
given by Gfeller & Bapst [1979] Ghassemlooy et al. [2012]:
HRef =

A(m1+1)
2pi2d21d22
cos(ϕ)m1rTs(ψ)g(ψ)
×dA cos(α) cos(β) cos(ψ), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ Ψc,
0 elsewhere,
(3.7)
where ϕ is the incidence angle with respect to the lighting source axis; d1 and
d2 are, respectively, the distance from the lighting source to the surface element,
and from there to the receiver; r is the reflection coefficient of the wall or the
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Figure 3.4: Optical power spectra of common ambient infrared sources Ghassem-
looy et al. [2012].
floor; and m1 is the Lambert’s mode number, which is calculated from Eq. (3.5),
but with semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2 for the lighting source (rather than
Θ1/2). In order to calculate the collected power at the receiver, one then needs
to integrate over the entire reflection area.
3.5 Background noise
The downside of indoor communications is the existence of severe ambient light.
In essence, shot noise is induced in the photodiode by the irradiance of sunlight
and artificial lamps. These sources radiate substantially in the band of low cost
sources, which affects the scheme’s performance. In addition, there is thermal
noise in the receiver, which is modelled by the Boltzmann formula, and also dark
current noise which varies between photodetectors, depending on the manufac-
turing technology Dusek et al. [2006]. Such noise would accordingly increase the
error probability. In Fig. 3.4, ambient light that caused by the Sun and an incan-
descent lamp emit continuously over a wide range of wavelengths. In contrast,
some common artificial sources send out a radiation mostly within the visible
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spectrum, which may extend to the first window of IR. With reference to eye
safety, a careful attention should be given to the employed power level when em-
ploying wavelengths below 1400 nm; see Fig. 3.4. To reduce the effects of ambient
light, it is important to realize higher SNR values at the receiver.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, a short description of OWC is provided. This includes OWC chan-
nel descriptions, links categories, channel modelling in OWC, and background
noise. The latter poses a challenge for QKD, however, as the transmitted power
is limited to about that of a single photon per pulse. It would be interesting to
see if we can operate QKD in indoor environments despite the high background
noise in such channels as we describe in the following chapter.
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The feasibility of wireless QKD
in indoor environments
4.1 Introduction
Nowadays, there is an increasing demand for data security in numerous aspects
of data exchange. Users are tending to use their personal devices to connect wire-
lessly to obtain many services. Remote access from offices or residential places to
services such as mobile banking requires a high level of security. This issue worries
people about their information security, since data security has been compromised
in many cases. QKD can provide a revolutionary cryptographic technique with
the aim of achieving security in data transmission. QKD effectively use quantum
mechanics to provide a secret method for distributing random keys between two
remote users over an optical channel. Here, we aim to fascilitate the access part of
hybrid quantum-classical networks by enabling users to exchange both quantum
and classical signals from indoor environments. This is accomplished by adopting
a regime of operation in which wireless indoor QKD is feasible.
In the following, we first describe the system of wireless QKD in indoor envir-
onments. This is followed by a preliminary step towards the feasibility assessment,
which is evaluating the level of background noise and loss in such environments. A
proper key rate analysis is explained next. This is to estimate the achievable key
rate in different cases where the QKD source is perfect or with known/unknown
flaws. Finally, the numerical results and summary are presented.
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4.2 System Description
In this section, we describe the setup and the components used in our wireless
QKD system. Here we consider a particular scenario in which we have an empty
window-less room of X×Y×Z dimensions, which has been illuminated by an
artificial source of light; see Fig. 3.3. While this may not be exactly the case in a
practical scenario, this particular setting allows us to properly study the resilience
of the system to background noise. More realistic cases can also be investigated
by properly adjusting the lighting source characteristics. The lighting source is
assumed to be a Lambertian one with a semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2 located
at the centre of the ceiling. The contribution of the light source is calculated via
its power spectral density (PSD), denoted by S, at the operating wavelength of
the QKD link, denoted by λ.
We assume that the QKD link is composed of two components. The QKD
receiver, or Bob’s box, is fixed and located at the centre of the ceiling, while
the QKD transmitter, or Alice’s device, can be anywhere on the floor with a
semi-angle at half power of Θ1/2. With regards to the QKD receiver and the
artificial light source, we assume that the QKD receiver would just receive the
reflected light from the walls and the floor and no light would enter the receiver
directly from the bulb. This is achievable in practice by using certain reflectors
that confine the radiation of the light source toward the floor. For simplicity,
however, we assume that the lamp position is at the same level of the ceiling as
the QKD receiver, and that the path between QKD transmitter and receiver is
not blocked. We also implicitly assume that the QKD source shines light in an
upward direction toward the ceiling. This requires a minimal alignment, which
can be done by the users the same way that a mobile user may avoid being
in a deep fading point when using their mobile phones or given by instructions
given on the screen. If the light beams used are not too narrow, then the total
performance is expected to be tolerant of some movements. If they are narrow,
however, then active beam steering would be required. We will see what range
of beam angles we can use in our numerical results section. We assume that the
QKD receiver has a detection area A and an optical filter bandwidth ∆λ. The
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unwanted light is filtered out best if the filter’s bandwidth matches 1/T , where
T is the width of the transmitted pulses by the QKD user.
We assume that the decoy-state variation of the BB84 protocol is in use Ma
et al. [2005]. The key advantage of the decoy-state protocol is in allowing us to
use weak laser pulses, instead of ideal single photon sources, at the source. This,
while being immune to potential photon-number splitting (PNS) attacks Brassard
et al. [2000], offers a practical inexpensive solution for QKD encoders. We employ
time-bin encoding Brendel et al. [1999], rather than polarization, to implement
the BB84 protocol. In this scheme, the information is encoded onto the phase
difference between two consecutive pulses, see Sec. 2.2.1. The possible advant-
age over polarization encoding is that we do not need to establish an identical
polarization reference frame between a mobile device and the receiver. This can
much simplify the alignment requirement and would allow us to use wider beams
at the transmitter.
We consider three cases with regards to the QKD encoders. We first assume
that the QKD encoding is carried out perfectly; that is, the phase difference
between the two consecutive pulses is exactly as the protocol requires. We con-
sider both cases of infinitely many and weak+vacuum Ma et al. [2005] decoy
states in this scenario. We also consider the case of using imperfect encoders. In
this scenario, we assume that the device can be either characterized, in the sense
that the QKD source has known flaws Tamaki et al. [2014], or uncharacterized
but has a fixed deviation from the ideal setting. In the latter case, we use RFI-
QKD protocol (see Sec. 2.4.3) Laing et al. [2010b], which has also been used in
recent demonstrations of polarization-encoded handheld QKD Chun et al. [2017],
Duligall et al. [2006]. The difference here is that, in the latter experiments, we
need to at least know the reference for one polarization axis. In time-bin encod-
ing protocols, the equivalent requirement would be to have two distinct time bins
known to the receiver. The latter requirement is expected to be easier to achieve
in practice for users that carry and move their QKD encoders. In section 4.4, the
secret key rate analysis for each case will be given.
We consider the regime of operation when the reflected pulses off the walls
are not overlapping in time with the main direct signal. This happens when
the transmitted pulses are short in comparison to the transmission delay. This
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is the case in the practical regime of operation when high rate communications
is desired. In this case, we neglect to collect the reflected QKD signals off the
walls. We also assume that none of these reflected pulses will interfere with the
forthcoming QKD pulses. That would imply that the repetition rate of the QKD
link must be on the order of 100 MHz or lower, which is suitable for our scheme.
Two scenarios are considered in this work. We first look at the case where
the lighting source is turned off in which case, the background noise is assumed
to be isotropic ambient light noise with a spectral irradiance denoted by pn.
The variation in the receiver’s FOV in this case would affect the corresponding
value of the channel transmittance of the QKD link. In the second scenario, we
consider the effect of the artificial light source by accounting for the reflections
from the walls and the floor, whose reflection coefficients are denoted by r1 and
r2, respectively. The background noise at the QKD receiver, from the lighting
source, will go up with increase in S, the power spectral density (PSD), while
the loss in the channel would increase with the receiver FOV. The latter would
determine how much mobility may be allowed. We therefore look at the trade-off
between these two parameters in determining the secure versus insecure regimes
of operations. Before doing that, in the following section, we first employ the
propagation models in OWC for estimating path loss and background noise in
the room.
4.3 Channel Characterization
Indoor environments can impose severe conditions for the operation of a QKD
system, such as that in Fig. 3.3. This includes the issues of path loss, especially
if a wide beam needs to be used, and the background noise, which also affects
the performance of the scheme by increasing the error rate. In this section, we
estimate the path loss and the background noise collected by the QKD receiver
using established OWC models.
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4.3.1 Path Loss Estimation
Due to path loss, the recipient, Bob, would receive a portion of the photons sent
by the sender, Alice. As pointed out in Ch. 3, this is estimated by the channel
DC-gain, denoted by HDC, in OWC channels. The received power depends on the
distance between the sender and the receiver, as well as the degree of directionality
and the alignment. For the line-of-sight link between the QKD transmitter and
receiver, the DC-gain is given by Eq. (3.4) Kahn & Barry [1997].
4.3.2 Background Noise Analysis
Two sources of background noise are accounted for in our analysis. Ambient light
noise is considered first, which is due to black body radiation in the surrounding
environment. The ambient light is assumed to be isotropic. The second source
of background noise is the artificial lighting source in the room.
Let us first assume that the lighting source is off. The background noise in
this case is due to isotropic ambient light. The received power for such isotropic
ambient light is given by Kahn & Barry [1997]:
Pn,isotropic(λ) = pn(λ)∆λTsAn2. (4.1)
The average number of detected photons per mode for a pulse with duration τ is
given by:
n
(1)
B =
Pn,isotropic(λ)τηd/2
hc/λ
, (4.2)
where c is the speed of light in the vacuum, ηd is the single-photon detector
efficiency, and h is Planck’s constant.
Next, the background noise at the QKD receiver due to the lighting source
is calculated. The light from the source can indirectly enter our QKD receiver
via reflections off the walls and the floor. We obtain the amount of reflected
power that may enter the QKD receiver by partitioning the floor and the walls
into surface elements of area dA and then calculating the contribution from each
of these elements at the QKD receiver. The walls and the floor are modelled as
diffuse reflectors, and we use the model presented in Gfeller & Bapst [1979] to
approximate the reflection pattern of the walls and the floor. Suppose the incident
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and reflected angles that the beams make with respect to the wall and the floor
normal are α and β, respectively; see Fig. 3.3. The reflected beams would enter
the QKD receiver if the receiving angle, ψ, with respect to the receiver normal,
is less than Ψc. The portion of this reflected light that may enter the receiver
is estimated by calculating the DC-gain for the reflected beam, HRef, as already
computed in Eq. (3.7).
By integrating over the walls and the floor, the average number of detected
photons, per detector, at the QKD receiver due to the lighting source is then
given by:
n
(2)
B =
S(λ)∆λτηd/2
hc/λ
∫ ∫
walls,floor
HRef. (4.3)
Different sources of background noise have different spectral irradiance over
different ranges of wavelength. The ambient light caused by the Sun or an in-
candescent lamp covers a wide range of wavelengths and could generate a large
number of background photons within a pulse period. In contrast, some artifi-
cial light sources, such as white LED bulbs, transmit mostly within the visible
spectrum, possibly extended to the first window of infrared. For QKD systems
operating at 880 nm or 1550 nm of wavelengths, the latter can then be a more
tolerable source of noise.
In order to accurately estimate the impact of white LED bulbs, we measured
the irradiance of two randomly selected white LED bulbs, with an equivalent
brightness to a 60-W incandescent lamp. The measurements were conducted
by Photometric and Optical Testing Services. Spectral irradiance measurements
have been done at a distance of 50 cm from the centre of each bulb, from which
the bulb’s PSD has been calculated; see Fig. 4.1. The latter is measured to be on
the order of 10−5 (W/nm) at 880 nm. In this case, for the parameter values in
Table 4.1, the estimated value in Eq. (4.3), at FOV=20◦, is equal to 1.8× 10−5.
This is comparable to the dark count rate and it turns out, as will be shown
later, that QKD operation can be feasible for such levels of external noise. The
spectral irradiance for the sun is three orders of magnitude higher than that of
the LED bulbs, hence the QKD system may only work under daylight exposure if
the FOV is extremely narrow. In windowless room, however, The typical room-
temperature black-body radiation from objects in the room is orders of magnitude
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Figure 4.1: Power spectral density of two LED bulbs, equivalent to a 60-W in-
candescent lamp: A 650-lumen cool white LED manufactured by AURAGLOW
(dashed), and a 805-lumen warm white LED bulb manufactured by INTEGRAL
(solid). The wriggly form of the curves at the two far ends of the spectrum is due
to the measurement precision.
weaker than that of LED bulbs and it is often negligible, as we show later in this
chapter.
4.4 Secret-Key Rate Analysis
In this section, we present the rate analysis for our QKD system. The secret key
generation rate, defined here as the probability of obtaining a secret key bit per
transmitted quantum signal, is one of the key figures of merit for QKD systems.
It will be affected by the amount of noise or eavesdropping activities, modeled by
QBER of the system. The latter depends on the ambient noise and eavesdropping
activities. QBER is defined as the probability of having non-identical bits in the
sifted bits of Alice and Bob. In QKD protocols, if QBER is above a certain
level, the protocol is aborted. In this section, we calculate the relevant key rate
parameters for the three encoding techniques described in section 4.2, in the
normal operating mode of the system, when there is no eavesdropper present.
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4.4.1 Decoy-state BB84 with perfect encoders
Here, we assume that Alice uses a perfect encoder, where decoy-state BB84 pro-
tocol is in use. The decoy-state technique, as mentioned earlier in Sec. 2.4.2, was
proposed to combat the PNS attack Brassard et al. [2000].
The secret key generation rate for the employed decoy-state protocol is lower
bounded by Ma et al. [2005]
R ≥ q{−Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1[1− h(e1)]}, (4.4)
where all new parameters are defined in Appendix A. If we use a two-decoy-state
protocol, such as vacuum+weak, Y1, Q1, and e1 can be bounded by the techniques
presented in Ma et al. [2005], and explained in Appendix A.
4.4.2 Decoy-state QKD with known source flaws
We investigate here the case of using non-ideal QKD encoders, for which the
extent of imperfection state preparation is assumed to be known. This concerns a
user/manufacturer that have characterized the QKD devices. In order to obtain a
fair comparison with other cases we consider, we assume that the quantum states
in the Z basis, by which the secret keys are generated, are well aligned. In this
basis, |0〉Z and |1〉Z represent single-photon states corresponding to the first and
second time bin, respectively. For the sake of modeling the source flaws, however,
we assume that the basis states in the X basis, |0〉X and |1〉X , are, respectively,
given by cos
(
pi
4 +
δ
2
)
|0〉Z + sin
(
pi
4 +
δ
2
)
|1〉Z and cos
(
pi
4 +
δ
2
)
|0〉Z − sin
(
pi
4 +
δ
2
)
|1〉Z ,
where δ models the deviation from the ideal state. At δ = 0, |0〉X and |1〉X
describe two consecutive pulses with phase differences of 0◦ and 180◦, respectively.
The asymptotic key rate in this case is given by Tamaki et al. [2014]
R = Q1[1− h(e(1)x )]−Qµfh(Eµ), (4.5)
where Q1, Qµ, and Eµ are the same as those given for the decoy-state BB84.
The phase error rate e(1)x is expressed in terms of the conditional probabilities
as Tamaki et al. [2014]
e(1)x =
Y1X|0X + Y0X|1X
Y1X|0X + Y0X|1X + Y1X|1X + Y0X|0X
, (4.6)
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where, YsX |jX , for single-photon states, of our channel model is given by
YsX |jX = η[PsX |jX (1− nN) +
1
2nN ]
+ (1− η)[nN(1− nN) + n2N/2], (4.7)
where P0X |0X = P1X |1X = 12 [1 + sin
(
pi
2 + δ
)
] and P0X |1X = P1X |0X = 12 [1 −
sin
(
pi
2 + δ
)
].
4.4.3 Decoy state QKD with partially unknown source
flaws
If the encoder imperfections are unknown, but fixed, we can use the RFI-QKD
protocol Laing et al. [2010b], instead of BB84, with the decoy-state technique.
This case corresponds to scenarios where the users cannot characterize their
devices and/or the manufacturers have not specified the extent of possible im-
perfections in the encoders. In the RFI-QKD protocol, one basis, Z, is supposed
to be known and identical to both users, while X and Y bases can be differ-
ent. In our time-bin encoding, the Z basis is defined by each of the time-bin
modes, whereas X and Y eigenstates are, respectively, given by superposition
states (|0〉Z ± |1〉Z)/
√
2 and (|0〉Z ± i|1〉Z)/
√
2. We model the difference between
the X (Y ) operator on Alice side, XA (YA), and that of Bob’s side XB (YB) by a
rotation parameter ξ, which gives us the following:
XB = cos(ξ)XA + sin(ξ)YA and YB = cos(ξ)YA − sin(ξ)XA. (4.8)
The estimated key generation rate for RFI-QKD with decoy-state technique
is given by Wang et al. [2015b]
R > −Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1(1− IE), (4.9)
where Qµ, Eµ, e1, and Q1 are the same as those given for the decoy-state BB84
protocol (Appendix A), and other parameters are defined in Appendix B.
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4.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we numerically study the feasibility of wireless indoor QKD by
looking at different scenarios. Table 4.1 summarizes the nominal values used
in our numerical results. These parameter values are based on the available
technology for QKD systems. For instance, the values used for detector efficiency
and dark count can be achieved by silicon APDs Hadfield [2009]. Recent GHz-rate
QKD demonstrations have also used pulse durations on the order of hundreds of
ps with a correspondingly narrow filter at the receiver Patel et al. [2014a]. We use
0.5 photons per signal pulse, which is the near optimal value for µ in the decoy-
state BB84 protocol. The room dimensions are representing a typical room with
higher reflections from the walls than the floor, which might have carpeting. In
a large partitioned office space, this can represent one cubicle in the room, or
the area that can be covered by one QKD receiver. We also assume a rather
large semi-angle at half power for both the lighting source and the QKD source,
which overestimates the errors we may have in a practical setup. The latter will,
however, be crucial for mobility features.
Before analyzing the key rate performance, let us start by illustrating how
the position of the QKD source and its beam size, as well as the receiver’s FOV,
would affect the path loss. Figure 4.2 shows that the position of the QKD source
with respect to its receiver can harshly affect the channel loss. In our case, moving
from the centre of the room to one of its corners adds nearly 10 dB to the channel
loss. This is partly because of the additional distance, but mainly because of the
loose alignment we have adopted for our system. In our setup, we have assumed
that the QKD source emits light upward, at a right angle with the floor, to the
ceiling. There is also the interplay between the source semi-angle and the total
loss. The lower the source semi-angle is the larger m would be in Eq. (3.4). This
means that for small values of φ, i.e., when the QKD source is near the centre
of the room, there may be some gain in the channel loss proportional to m + 1,
but once φ increases, by moving toward the corners, that benefit may be washed
away by the cos(φ)m term in Eq. (3.4). The receiver’s FOV would also affect
the loss in a negative way. One may assume that a larger FOV would result
in higher power collection, but, quite the opposite, because of the concentrator
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Table 4.1: Nominal values used for our system parameters.
Symbol Parameter Values
Φ1/2 Semi-angle at half power of the bulb 70◦
Θ1/2 Semi-angle at half power of QKD source 30◦
λ Wavelength of QKD source 880 nm
X, Y, Z Room size 4,4,3 m
r1, r2 Reflection coefficients of the walls and floor 0.7 , 0.1
ηd Detector efficiency 0.6
τ Pulse width 100 ps
∆λ Optical filter bandwidth λ2
τc
A Detector area 1 cm2
n Refractive index of the concentrator 1.5
Ts Optical filter transmission 1
nD Dark count 1000τ
µ Average no. of photons per signal pulse 0.5
ν1, ν2 Ave. no. of photons/pulse for decoy states 0.1, 0
f Inefficiency of error correction 1.16
ed Relative-phase distortion probability 0
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Figure 4.2: Total loss, −10 log10(ηdHDC/2), for the QKD source in centre and
corner positions. Path loss depends on the semi-angle at half power, the position
of the QKD source, and the receiver’s FOV, Ψc.
gain, the larger the FOV is, the higher the channel loss would be. This is evident
from all the curves in Fig. 4.2. A larger FOV would, however, enable the QKD
source to be seen over a wider range. That advantage could, however, come with
additional background noise that may sneak into the receiver. Overall, Fig. 4.2
indicates that, without beam steering, the QKD system may need to tolerate a
large amount of propagation loss in the wireless channel.
In the following, we first assess the in-principle feasibility of wireless QKD
using the decoy-state BB84 protocol with perfect encoders. We then consider the
effect of encoder imperfections in our analysis.
4.5.1 Secure versus Insecure Regions
In this section, two scenarios of wireless QKD in indoor environments are ex-
amined, and the corresponding key generation rates are obtained using loss and
background noise calculations in the previous sections. In the first scenario, only
the background noise due to the isotropic ambient light is included. The key gen-
eration rate is then presented versus a range of FOVs as the latter has an impact
on path loss as shown in Fig. 4.2. In the second scenario, we account for the
background noise induced by the lighting source. In such a case, the amount of
background noise would depend on the PSD of the lighting source and the QKD
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Figure 4.3: Secret key rate per transmitted pulse when the lighting source is
off, and the background noise is only due to the ambient noise that has spectral
irradiance denoted by pn. The QKD source is sending light upward with 30◦. The
decoy-state BB84 protocol with an infinite number of decoy states and perfect
encoders are employed here.
receiver’s FOV. In both cases, we use the decoy-state encoding with infinitely
many decoy states as described in Sec. 4.4.1.
Figure 4.3 shows the secret key generation rate in a dark room when the QKD
transmitter is either at the centre of the room, or at a corner. In both cases, the
QKD receiver is fixed at the centre of the ceiling. When the QKD source is
located at the centre of the room, the system would tolerate spectral irradiance
of ambient noise on the order of 10−8 W/nm/m2, as shown in Fig. 4.3. Due
to additional loss, the scheme would tolerate less ambient noise when the QKD
source is located at a corner of the room. The ambient light noise considered in
this case is due to black body radiation in the surrounding environment, whose
effect is calculated via (4.2). This implies that the resulting background noise
is constant in this case, and the drop in rate in Fig. 4.3 is merely because of
the loss in the system as seen in Fig. 4.2. The spectral intensity emitted at
room temperature (300 K) from objects, such as the human body, is expected
to be low at the operating wavelength of our scheme. According to Planck’s
formula, the spectral irradiance at room temperature at 880 nm is on the order
of 10−18 W/nm/m2, which is far below the tolerable amount of ambient noise in
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Figure 4.4: (a) Background noise (BN) in count per pulse (c/p), generated by
the artificial light source, collected by the QKD receiver versus FOV, Ψc. (b)
The channel loss, 1/HDC, and QBER, Eµ, versus FOV. The QKD source is loc-
ated either at the centre or corner of the room floor. The PSD of the bulb is
10−5 W/nm.
our scheme. This is mainly because we assume that there would be no sun light
in the room, which can adversely affect system performance. In the case of our
window-less room, however, it is safe to neglect the effect of isotropic ambient
noise in our system. We next consider the effect of the lighting source on our
QKD operation.
When the lighting source is on, additional background noise would sneak into
the QKD receiver. The choice of FOV to some extent affects the amount of
background noise. Figure 4.4 shows the effect of FOV on the background noise,
as well as on HDC and the overall QBER, Eµ. It is interesting to see that,
at the beginning, the background noise would slightly drop until FOV reaches
near 34◦, from which point it gradually increases with FOV. For narrow FOVs,
the concentrator gain is rather high, but it sharply approaches n2 when FOV
increases. This can be seen in the behavior of HDC as well. The drop in the
concentrator gain can justify the initial decline of the background noise. Another
contributing factor is that for FOV< 34◦, the collected power at the QKD receiver
is mainly induced by the reflection from the floor, whereas for FOV > 34◦, the
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reflection from the four walls would also matter. We have chosen much higher
reflection coefficient from the walls (0.7) than the floor (0.1), which justifies the
increase in the background noise. From the QBER curves in Fig. 4.4 it can be seen
that the QBER is larger than its acceptable threshold for large FOVs. It is then
fair to assume that within the region of interest for the FOV, the background
noise is nearly constant while the channel gain drops with the increase in the
FOV.
Figure 4.5 shows the secret key generation rate per transmitted pulse when
the lighting source is on and the QKD source is placed at the centre of the room’s
floor facing up toward the receiver. The figure shows the trade-off between the
receiver’s FOV and the PSD of the light source. The higher the PSD is, the
lower the FOV should be in order to improve the signal to noise ratio at the
QKD receiver. This restriction partitions the x-y plane in Fig. 4.5 into secure
and insecure regions. The insecure region is when the lower bound on the key
rate is zero, i.e, when the secure exchange of keys cannot be guaranteed. The
secure region then specifies when QKD operation is feasible within the setting in
our setup. Figure 4.5 implies that with a PSD of 10−5 W/nm, corresponding to
white LED bulbs, the QKD receiver’s FOV should be less than 7◦.
Figure 4.6 shows the secret key generation rate per transmitted pulse when
the transmitter has moved to a corner of the room. We assume that the QKD
source has a rather large transmission angle (30◦), in which case a portion of its
beam has the chance to be received by the receiver. This can possibly be achieved
by a diffuser, if the source beam is too narrow. We assume that the source is
again sending light up toward the ceiling. Being at the corner of the room, the
channel DC-gain is lower than that of a transmitter at the centre of the room.
This would imply that lower amounts of background noise can be tolerated in
this case. The trade-off between the FOV and PSD has been shown in Fig. 4.6.
In this case, at a PSD of 10−5 W/nm, the QKD receiver’s FOV should be less
than 4◦.
Figures 4.5 and 4.6 imply that while there are certain regions in which secret
key exchange is possible with minimal beam alignment, additional beam steer-
ing can substantially improve the system performance. At the source, this can
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Figure 4.5: Secret key rate per transmitted pulse vesus power spectral density
and QKD receiver’s field of view, Ψc, for a QKD source (Θ1/2 = 30◦) at the centre
of the floor in the presence of a lighting source. The decoy-state BB84 protocol
with an infinite number of decoy states and perfect encoders are assumed here.
Figure 4.6: Secret key rate per transmitted pulse vesus power spectral density and
QKD receiver’s field of view, Ψc, for a QKD source with (Θ1/2 = 30◦) in a corner
of the room in the presence of a lighting source. The decoy-state BB84 protocol
with an infinite number of decoy states and perfect encoders are employed.
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Figure 4.7: Secret key rate per transmitted pulse vesus power spectral density
and QKD receiver’s field of view, Ψc, for the QKD source in a corner of the room
with additional beam steering. The QKD beam is directed into the receiver with
Θ1/2 = 5◦. The decoy-state BB84 protocol with an infinite number of decoy states
and perfect encoders are employed.
be achieved by narrowing the light beam and directing it toward the QKD re-
ceiver Gomez et al. [2015]. Here, we simulate this effect by directing a beam with
Θ1/2 = 5◦ toward the QKD receiver, while the receiver’s telescope orientation is
fixed facing downward. As shown in Fig. 4.7, the system can now tolerate a larger
amount of PSD in comparison to Fig. 4.6, where the QKD source is sending light
in a non-direct manner with respect to the QKD receiver. Alternatively, in this
case, one can use a larger FOV at the receiver, which allows us to cover a larger
area for a mobile user.
4.5.2 More practical encoding techniques
After assessing the feasibility of wireless indoor QKD using perfect encoders, here
we study the practical cases presented in Sec. 4.2. We consider the vacuum+weak
decoy-state QKD, QKD with known source flaws, and RFI-QKD when the source
flaws are partially known. We use the results of Sec. 4.4 to calculate the key rate
in each case. Figures 4.8(a) and (b) show the secret key generation rate in each
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case where the QKD source is, respectively, at the centre and the corner of the
room. There is only loose alignment between the source and the receiver, but
here we have assumed a lower PSD for the lighting source at 10−6 W/nm. In the
case of known source flaws we have assumed 10% error in the X basis, whereas in
the RFI-QKD curve X and Y bases are rotated by a fix, but unknown, phase. In
Fig. 4.8(a), when the source is at the centre of the room, the performance in all
cases with an imperfect encoder is very close to the perfect case. This is expected
as this case is less vulnerable to the alignment condition. When the source moves
to the corner of the room, the sensitivity to the FOV becomes higher, but still
with an FOV of 7◦, it is still possible to exchange secret keys. At this FOV, the
drop in key rate, is less than one order of magnitude when we, instead of perfect
encoders, use RFI-QKD. This implies that by the proper choice of protocol we
can make the system quite resilient to possible imperfections at its encoders.
The above cases illustrate the possibility of using QKD in certain indoor en-
vironments. Whether or not we need to employ extensive beam steering in our
scheme would depend on the application scenario and its target key rate. One
can think of certain scenarios in which the amount of keys generated by loose
beam steering would still be sufficient for the application in mind. For instance,
consider a bank customer that uses an advanced encryption standard (AES) pro-
tocol, supplemented by QKD generated seeds, for his/her banking transactions.
Assuming that each session roughly requires 1 kb of secret key, the user can
store the amount of keys required for nearly 600 sessions within 100 s in one
trip to the bank, where according to Fig. 4.5, a key rate of 6 kbps, at a pulse
repetition rate of 100 MHz, can be achieved when the receiver’s FOV and PSD
are, respectively, 5◦ and 10−5 W/nm. For applications with higher key usage,
e.g., secure video streaming, one may need higher key rates only achievable if the
transmitter-receiver pair are fully aligned. In such cases, one possible solution is
to use docking stations, which ensures alignment without implementing all the
necessary optical elements on a portable/mobile device.
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Figure 4.8: Secret key rate per transmitted pulse versus the QKD receiver FOV,
for different QKD protocols (PE, perfect encoding; DS, decoy state; SF, source
flaw; V + W, vacuum + weak). (a) The QKD source is located at the centre of
the room. (b) The QKD source is located at a corner of the room. The PSD of
the bulb is 10−6 W/nm.
4.6 Summary
We studied and analysed the feasibility of wireless QKD in indoor environments.
We exploited the known OWC models to estimate the loss and background noise
in such environments. We considered different scenarios in which the QKD source
is perfect or with known/unknown flaws. Despite the severe loss and background
noise in indoor environments, we showed that a practical wireless indoor QKD
could exist. This would enable end users to exchange secret keys with other
network users in a convenient way, as we will show in the following chapter.
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Chapter 5
Wireless access to a hybrid
quantum-classical network
5.1 Introduction
QKD will possibly be the most imminent application of quantum technologies in
our daily life. There are, however, certain problems we have to resolve before
making such a technology available to everyone. By adopting wireless indoor
QKD links and embedding them into fiber-based PONs, users would be able to
access conveniently to hybrid quantum-classical networks. Scenarios of interest
include utilizing it in banks and public places to exchange data securely with
service providers. Untrusted relay points, can be used in public places, to link a
wireless end user and the corresponding central office, when MDI-QKD protocol
is in use.
In this chapter, we address wireless access to a hybrid quantum-classical net-
work. We propose practical configurations that would enable wireless access to
such networks. In the following, we first provide a system description, which
includes the proposed setups. This is followed by characterizing the channel,
namely, the indoor optical wireless channel and optical fiber link. Next, key rate
analysis is explained, where DV and CV-QKD protocols are considered. Finally,
the numerical results and summary are presented
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5.2 System Description
In this section, we describe our proposed setups for hybrid quantum-classical ac-
cess networks comprised of optical wireless and fiber-optic links. Such setups
can wirelessly connect a mobile user, in indoor environments, to the central of-
fice in access networks; see Fig. 5.1. We assume a total of N end users, which
are connected to the central office via a dense wavelength-division multiplexing
(DWDM) PON. The corresponding wavelengths assigned to quantum and clas-
sical data channels are, respectively, denoted by Q = {λq1 , λq2 , ...,λqN}, D =
{λd1 , λd2 , ...,λdN}. The kth user, k = 1, . . . , N , employs wavelength λqk (λdk) to
communicate his/her quantum (classical) signals to the central office, as shown
in Fig. 5.1. The same wavelengths are also used for the downlink. In order to
heuristically reduce the Raman noise effect, we assume that the lower wavelength
grid is allocated to the QKD channels, while the upper grid is assigned to data
channels Bahrani et al. [2016a]. For instance, for the lower wavelength grid,
wavelengths of 1530.8 nm, 1531.6 nm, ...,1555.62 nm, with 100 GHz channel spa-
cing, are assumed to be used Eraerds et al. [2010]. In principle, one can use an
optimised algorithm to minimise the Raman noise Bahrani et al. [2018].
For our wireless user, we consider a particular indoor environment, in which
it has been shown that wireless QKD is feasible Elmabrok & Razavi [2015], El-
mabrok et al. [2018]; see chapter 4. In this setting, a window-less room, of
X × Y × Z dimensions, is lit by an artificial light source. The possibly mobile
QKD transmitter is placed on the floor and it transmits light toward the ceiling.
The transmitter module may or may not be equipped with beam steering tools.
In the former case, we assume that a minimal manual alignment is in place, by
which the QKD source is facing the ceiling. This can be achieved by providing
some instructions for the end user during the QKD protocol. The QKD receiver
or the signal collector is fixed at the centre of the room’s ceiling; see Fig. 5.1. We
assume that, by using some dynamic beam steering, maximum possible power is
collected from the QKD source. This may be achieved by using additional beacon
pulses. The collected light may go through a non-imaging optical concentrator,
such as a compound parabolic collector, and then be filtered by a bandpass filter
before being detected or sent out toward its final destination.
57
5.2 System Description
Figure 5.1: Schematic view of exchanging secret keys between an indoor wireless
user with a central office at the end of an access network. The transmitter is
mobile, while the QKD receiver or the collection point is fixed on the ceiling.
In each setup, we particularly study three different cases regarding the pos-
ition of the mobile QKD device. Case 1 refers to the scenario when the QKD
transmitter is placed at the centre of the room’s floor and emits light upward with
semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2. In case 2, the same QKD transmitter as in case
1 is moved to a corner of the room in order to assess the mobility features. These
cases will represent the best and the worst case scenarios in terms of channel loss,
when minimal beam alignment is used at the transmitter end. In case 3, the light
beam at the QKD source is narrowed and is directed toward the QKD receiver
or the coupling element. This would correspond to the worst case scenario when
beam alignment is available at both the source and the receiver. In all cases,
we assume a static channel in our analysis, that is we assume that the channel
does not change during the key exchange procedure. The real mobile user is then
expected to experience a quality of service bounded by the worst and best-case
scenarios above.
We use a number of discrete and continuous-variable QKD protocols to invest-
igate the performance of the proposed configurations. In the case of DV protocols,
we use the time-bin encoding, in which the information is encoded onto the phase
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difference between two successive pulses Brendel et al. [1999]. We assume that
the gap between the two pulses is sufficiently short that similar phase distortions
would be applied to both time bins while traversing the channel. Possible dis-
crepancies are modeled by a relative-phase error term ed. The QKD protocols
considered here are already explained in Chapter 2. In the following, we first
describe our proposed setups and the QKD protocols used in each case, followed
by a description of the channel models.
5.2.1 The proposed setups
We consider four setups in which an indoor wireless user, Alice, equipped with
a QKD-enabled mobile device, would exchange secret keys with a remote party,
Bob, located at the central office. In order to keep the mobile user’s device
simple, we assume that Alice is only equipped with the QKD encoder. That would
imply that certain QKD schemes, such as entanglement-based QKD Bennett et al.
[1992b], are not suitable for our purpose if they require measuring single photons
at the mobile user’s end. Bob, however, represents the service provider node
and could be equipped with the encoder and/or the decoder module as needed.
Based on these assumptions, here, we consider several settings depending on the
existence or non-existence of a trusted/untrusted relay point between the wireless
user and Bob at the central office. In all setups, a data channel will be wavelength
multiplexed with the quantum one to be sent to the central office. We assume
that classical data is being modulated at a constant rate throughout the QKD
operation.
Setup 1 with a trusted relay point
Setup 1 is applicable whenever a trusted node between the sender and the recip-
ient exists. For instance, in a bank, we can physically secure a QKD relay node
inside the building with which the wireless QKD users in the room can exchange
secret keys. In Fig. 5.2, such a node is located on the ceiling and it is comprised
of Rx and Tx boxes. In this setup, the secret key exchange between Alice and
Bob is accomplished in two steps: a secret key, K1, is generated between Alice
and the Rx box in Fig. 5.2; also, independently but in parallel, another secure
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Figure 5.2: Setup 1, where secret key exchange between Alice and Bob is achieved
in two steps. K1 is generated between Alice and Rx, while K2 is generated
between Tx and Bob. The resultant key is computed by taking the XOR of K1
and K2. Three cases are examined according to the position and alignment of
the QKD transmitter. The DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols will be examined in
this setup. Dynamic beam steering is used at the Rx node.
key, K2, is exchanged between Tx and the relevant Bob in the central office. The
final secret key is then obtained by applying an exclusive-OR (XOR) operation
to K1 and K2. Note that in this setup both links are completely run separately;
therefore, the wavelength used in the wireless link does not need to be the same
as the wavelength used in the fiber link. In fact, for the wireless link, we use
880 nm range of wavelength, for which efficient and inexpensive single-photon
detectors are available. For the fiber link, conventional telecom wavelengths are
used. DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols will be used for this setup.
Setup 2 without a relay point
In this setup, we remove the need for having a relay point altogether. As shown in
Fig. 5.3, the signals transmitted by Alice are collected by a telescope and coupled
to a single-mode fiber to be sent to the central office. QKD measurements will
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Figure 5.3: Setup 2, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and Bob
using the DS-BB84 and GG02 protocols. The latter is only used in case 3. The
QKD signals are collected and coupled to the fiber and sent to Bob, where the
measurement is performed. Dynamic beam steering is used at the collection node.
then be performed at the central office. Because of this coupling requirement,
the wireless signals undergo an additional coupling loss in setup 2. To reduce
the coupling loss, in this setup, and, for fairness, in all others, we assume that
the telescope at the collection point can focus on the QKD source. This can be
achieved by additional beacon beams and MEMs steering mirrors Chun et al.
[2017]. In order to efficiently couple this photon to the fiber, the effective FOV at
the collection point should match the numerical aperture of a single-mode fiber.
That requires us to use FOVs roughly below 6◦, although, in practice, much
lower values may be needed. In this setup, DS-BB84 and GG02 can be suitable
protocols and will be examined in the following sections.
Setups 3 and 4 with untrusted relay points
The setups in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5 are of interest whenever the indoor environment
the wireless user is working at is not trustworthy. For instance, if the user is
working at a public place, such as a coffee shop or an airport, s/he may not
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Figure 5.4: Setup 3, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and Bob
using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the user’s end in this
setup.
necessarily trust the owners of the local system. In such setups, we can use the
MDI-QKD technique Lo et al. [2012] to directly interfere the quantum signal
sent by the users with that of the central office. This can be accomplished by, if
necessary, coupling the wireless signal into the fiber and performing a Bell-state
measurement (BSM) on the photons sent by Alice and Bob at either the user’s
end (setup 3), or at a certain place located between the sender and the recipient
at the central office (setup 4). In setup 4, we use the splitting terminal of a
PON to implement such BSMs. Note that in setups 3 and 4 we need to interfere
a single-mode signal traveling in fiber with a photon that has traveled through
the indoor channel. In order to satisfy the BSM indistinguishability criterion, we
then need to collect only one spatial mode from the wireless channel. The flexible
beam steering used at the collection node should then satisfy this requirement.
Here, we use a probabilistic setup for the BSM operation, as shown in Fig. 5.6.
In this setup, we interfere the light coming from the two users at a 50:50 (fiber-
based) beam splitter and then detect the outgoing signals using single-photon
detectors. This simple setup is suitable for time-bin encoding techniques in QKD,
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Figure 5.5: Setup 4, where secret keys are exchanged between Alice and the cent-
ral office using the MDI-QKD protocol. The BSM is performed at the splitting
point of the DWDM PON.
which offer certain advantages in both fiber and free-space QKD systems. In par-
ticular, they may suffer less from alignment issues as compared to polarization-
based encoding in wireless environments. Note that two successive clicks, one
corresponding to each time bin, is required to have a successful BSM. That
would require fast single-photon detectors with sub-nanosecond deadtimes. This
is achievable using self-difference feedback techniques developed recently Yuan
et al. [2007]. If such detectors are not available, one can rely on one click on each
detector, which roughly corresponds to declaring half of the success cases.
5.2.2 Channel Characterization
In this section, we model the two parts of our communication link, i.e., the
wireless and fiber-based components, and find out how much loss or background
noise they may introduce.
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Figure 5.6: The Bell-state measurement (BSM) module used in setups 3 and
4. This module works for time-bin encoded QKD signals. If fast detectors are
available, as assumed here, we can do two consecutive measurements on each time
bin. if not, we can still measure one out of four Bell states by relying on a single
click in total on each detector. BS: beamsplitter. PBS: Polarizing Beamsplitter.
PM: Phase modulator Ma et al. [2012a].
Indoor optical wireless channel
Because of path loss, Bob would receive a random portion of the polarized photons
that have been sent by Alice. The fraction of the transmitted power is estimated
by channel DC-gain HDC explained in Eq. (3.4).
Optical fiber link
As for the optical link, we make the following assumptions. We consider a loss
coefficient α in dB/km in the single-mode fiber. We also assume that the loss
contributed by each multi-port DWDM multiplexer, labeled as AWG (arrayed
waveguide grating) in Figs. 5.2–5.5 is Λ in dB. We neglect the loss associated
with two-to-one multiplexers.
As we mentioned earlier, the main source of background noise in QKD chan-
nels in a fiber link is Raman scattering. The Raman noise generated by a strong
classical signal spans over a wide range of frequencies, hence can populate the
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QKD receivers with unwanted signals Eraerds et al. [2010]. The receivers can
be affected by forward and backward scattered light depending on their locations
and the direction of light propagation Bahrani et al. [2016b]. For a classical signal
with intensity I at wavelength λd, the power of Raman noise at a QKD receiver
with bandwidth ∆λ centred at wavelength λq is given by Eraerds et al. [2010],
Patel et al. [2012]
IfR(I, L, λd, λq) = Ie−αrLLΓ(λd, λq)∆λ (5.1)
for forward scattering and
IbR(I, L, λd, λq) = I
(1− e−2αrL)
2αr
Γ(λd, λq)∆λ (5.2)
for backward scattering, where L is the fiber length and Γ(λd, λq) is the Raman
cross section (per unit of fiber length and bandwidth), which can be measured
experimentally. In our work, we have used the results reported in Eraerds et al.
[2010] for λd = 1550 nm and have used the prescription in Bahrani et al. [2016b]
to adapt it to any other wavelengths in the C band. In our numerical analysis,
we assume that the latter band (1530 - 1565 nm), is mainly used for 32 quantum
channels with 100 GHz channel spacing Eraerds et al. [2010].
The transmitted power I is also set to secure a bit error rate (BER) of no
more than 10−9 for all data channels. The QKD receiver would then collect a total
average number of photons, due to forward and backward scattering, respectively,
given by
µfR =
ηdI
f
RλqTd
hc
(5.3)
and
µbR =
ηdI
b
RλqTd
hc
, (5.4)
where Td, ηd and h, respectively, represent the detectors’ gate duration, their
quantum efficiency and Planck’s constant with c being the speed of light in the
vacuum.
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5.3 Key Rate Analysis
In this section, the secret key rate analysis for our proposed setups is presented
considering non-idealities in the system. The secret key rate is defined as the
asymptotic ratio between the number of secure bits and sifted bits. Without
loss of generality, we only calculate the rate for user 1 assuming that there is no
eavesdropper present. The DS-BB84 Ma et al. [2005] and GG02 protocols are
used for setups 1 and 2, while the MDI-QKD protocol Lo et al. [2012], Ma &
Razavi [2012] is employed for setups 3 and 4.
5.3.1 Setups 1 and 2
DS-BB84 protocol
The lower bound for the key generation rate in the limit of an infinitely long key
is given by Ma et al. [2005]
R ≥ q{−Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1[1− h(e1)]}, (5.5)
where all new parameters are defined in Appendix A. There, we show that the
expected value for these parameters in our loss and background induced model
for the channel mainly depends on two parameters: the overall efficiency of each
link η, and the total background noise per detector, denoted by nN . Here, nN
accounts for both dark counts and background noise in the link. In the following,
we specify how these parameters can be calculated in each setup.
In setup 1, we have two links, a wireless link and a wired link. In the following,
the parameter values for each link will be calculated separately.
Setup 1, wireless link: For the wireless channel, we assume that the back-
ground noise due to the artificial lighting source is denoted by nB1 , which can be
calculated using the methodology proposed in chapter 4 Elmabrok et al. [2018].
In our calculations, we upper bound nB1 by considering the case where the QKD
receiver is focused on the centre of the room. The total noise per detector, nN ,
is then given by nB1ηd1/2 + ndc, where ηd1 is the detector efficiency, for the de-
tector in the Rx box, and ndc is the dark count rate per pulse for each detector
in the Rx box in Fig. 5.2. We neglect the impact of the ambient noise in our
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windowless room Elmabrok et al. [2018]. The total transmissivity is also given by
η = HDCηd1/2. The factor 1/2 represents the loss in the passive time-bin decoder
consisted of a Mach-Zehnder interferometer.
Setup 1, fiber link: As for the fiber-based link, the background noise is mainly
induced by the Raman scattered light. In this setup, where Bob’s receiver is
at the central office, forward scattered light is generated because of the classical
signals sent by the users and backward scattered light is due to the signals sent
by the central office. The total power of Raman noise, at wavelength λq1 , for
forward and backward scattering are, respectively, given by
IfT1 = [I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1) +
N∑
k=2
IfR(Ie−αrLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10−2Λ/10
and
IbT1 = [IbR(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1) +
N∑
k=2
IbR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10−2Λ/10,
where L0 is the total distance between the central office and the AWG box at the
users’ splitting point and Lk is the distance of the kth user to the same AWG
in the access network. In the above equations, we have neglected the out-of-
band Raman noise that will be filtered by relevant multiplexers in our setup.
For instance, in calculating IfT1, we account for the effect of the forward Raman
noise by the data signal generated by User 1 over a total distance of L0 + L1,
but, a similar effect by other users is only accounted for over a distance L0.
That is because the AWG box filters most of the Raman noise at λq1 generated
over distances Lk and their effect can be neglected. By substituting the above
equations in 5.3 and 5.4, the total background noise per detector, at the Bob’s
end in Fig. 5.2, is given by
nN =
ηd2λq1Td
2hc (I
f
T1 + IbT1) + ndc, (5.6)
where ηd2 is the detector efficiency at the Bob’s receiver. Note that in setup 1
we consider two different values for ηd1 and ηd2 . The reason is that the former
corresponds to the available silicon APD single-photon detectors at 880 nm, while
the latter could be for InGaAs APD single-photon detectors within the 1550 nm
band.
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The total transmissivity η for the fiber link is given by ηfibηd2/2, where ηfib is
the optical fiber channel transmittance including the loss associated with AWGs
given by ηfib = 10−[α(L1+L0)+2Λ]/10.
Setup 2: In setup 2, the total Raman noise power for forward and backward
scattering, denoted by IfT2 and IbT2 are given by I
f
T1 and IbT1, respectively. The
total background noise per detector at Bob’s end in Fig. 5.3 is then given by
nN =
ηd2
2
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT2 + IbT2
)
+ nB1ηfibηcoup
]
+ ndc, (5.7)
where ηcoup is the additional air-to-fiber coupling loss that the indoor background
photons, generated by the bulb, will experience before reaching the QKD receiver.
The total channel transmittance between the sender and the recipient in this setup
is given by η = HDCηcoupηfibηd2/2.
GG02 protocol
The secure key rate for GG02 with reverse reconciliation under collective attacks
is given by Fossier et al. [2009]
K = βIAB − χBE, (5.8)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency. IAB and χBE are, respectively, the shared
information between Alice and Bob, and the amount of information obtained by
the adversary in reverse reconciliation. More details can be found in Appendix
D.
GG02 is characterized by the channel loss ηch and the excess noise ε. For
estimating the latter, we need to consider the contribution of the bulb, εb, as
well as the Raman scattering, εr. The total excess noise, ε, is then given by
εb + εr + εq, where εq is any other additional noise observed in the experiment.
In the Appendix D formulation, the excess noise terms must be calculated at the
input. For chaotic sources of light, if the average noise count at the end of a
channel with transmissivity ηt is given by n, the corresponding excess noise at
the input would be given by 2n/ηt Kumar et al. [2015], Qi et al. [2010b]. Below,
we use this expression to calculate εb and εr assuming that both the Raman noise
and the bulb-induced background noise are of chaotic-light nature.
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Setup 1, wireless link: In setup 1, the background noise due to the bulb
is denoted by nB1 . This is the total background noise at the Rx box input.
Given that the LO would pick a single spatio-temporal mode with matching
polarization, the corresponding count that sneaks into the homodyne receiver
would be nB1/2. The corresponding excess noise would then be given by εb =
nB1/HDC and ε = εb + εq. In this case, ηch = HDC. In an experiment, εq is often
calculated by measuring the corresponding parameter, εrecq , at the receiver. In
this case, εq = εrecq /(ηchηB), where ηB is Bob’s receiver overall efficiency.
Setup 1, fiber link: In this case, ηch = ηfib, εb = 0, and εr = nr/ηch, where
nr =
λq1Td
hc
(IfT1 + IbT1). (5.9)
Setup 2: In setup 2, ηch = HDCηcoupηfib, εb = nB1/HDC, and εr = nr/ηch, where
nr =
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT2 + IbT2
)
. (5.10)
In all CV-QKD setups, we assume that a phase reference for the LO is available
at the receiver.
5.3.2 Setups 3 and 4 with MDI-QKD protocol
The secret key rate for the MDI-QKD setup is given in Appendix C. The key
parameters to find for this scheme are ηa and ηb, which, respectively, correspond
to the total transmissivity seen by Alice and Bob channels, as well as nN , which
is the total background noise per detector. Here we find these parameters for
Setups 3 and 4.
Setup 3: The total forward and backward Raman noise power for setup 3 at
wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
IfT3 = [I
f
R(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1) + e−αrL1
N∑
k=2
IfR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]10−2Λ/10,
and
IbT3 = [IbR(I, L0 + L1, λd1 , λq1) + e−αrL1
N∑
k=2
IbR(Ie−αrLk , L0, λdk , λq1)]10−2Λ/10.
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The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 3 is then given by
nN =
ηd2
4
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT3 + IbT3
)
+ nB1ηcoup
]
+ ndc, (5.11)
where we account for one particular polarization entering the BSM module.
In setup 3, ηa = HDCηd2ηcoup/2 and ηb = ηd2ηfib/2, assuming an average loss
factor of 1/2 for polarization mismatch. Note that the two modes interfering at
the BSM must have matching polarizations. This can be achieved passively by
using polarization filters before the 50:50 beam splitter in the BSM, in which
case, an average loss of 1/2 is expected, or, alternatively, we need to use active
polarization stabilizer, for which the corresponding loss factor approaches one.
Setup 4: The total forward and backward Raman noise power for setup 4 at
wavelength λq1 are, respectively, given by
IfT4 = [I
f
R(I, L0, λd1 , λq1) +
N∑
k=2
IfR(I, L0, λdk , λq1)]× 10−2Λ/10 + IfR(I, L1, λd1 , λq1),
and
IbT4 = [IbR(Ie−αrL1 , L0, λd1 , λq1)+
N∑
k=2
IbR(Ie−αrLk , L0, λdk , λq1)+IbR(Ie−αrL0 , L1, λd1 , λq1)]10−2Λ/10.
The total noise per detector, nN , for setup 4 is as follows
nN =
ηd2
4
[
λq1Td
hc
(
IfT4 + IbT4
)
+ nB1ηcoup10−αL1/10
]
+ ndc. (5.12)
In setup 4, ηa = HDCηd2ηcoup10−αL1/10/2 and ηb = ηd210−[αL0+2Λ]/10/2.
5.4 Numerical Results
In this section, we provide some numerical results for secret key rates in the four
proposed setups. We use a DWDM scheme with 100 GHz channel spacing in
the C-band with 32 users. We define Q = {1530.8 nm, 1531.6 nm,...,1555.62
nm} and D = {1560.4 nm, 1561.2 nm,...,1585.2 nm} for quantum and classical
channels, respectively. We assume that λq1 is 1555.62 nm and the corresponding
λd1 is 1585.2 nm. The classical data is transmitted with launch power I =
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10(−3.85+αL/10+2Λ/10) mW, which corresponds to receiver sensitivity of -38.5 dB
guaranteeing a BER < 10−9 Bahrani et al. [2016b]. In all setups, we assume that
L1 = L2 = · · · = LN all equal to 500 m.
Other nominal parameter values used in our simulation are summarized in
Table 5.1. These are based on values that are technologically available today. In
particular, for DV-QKD systems, we assume silicon-based single-photon detectors
are used in the 800 nm regime (setup 1, indoor channel), whereas GaAs detectors
may need to be used in the 1550 nm regime (all other setups). The former often
have higher quantum efficiencies than the latter. That is why in our numerical
parameters, ηd1 is twice as big as ηd2. The dark count rate in such detectors varies
from (100–1000)/s for an APD, to (1–100)/s for superconducting detectors Dusek
et al. [2006]. The average dark count rate considered here is 1000/s, which, over
a period of 100 ps, will result in ndc = 10−7. In the CV-QKD system, ηB is Bob’s
receiver overall efficiency, which includes detector efficiencies and any insertion
loss in the homodyne receiver. The parameter β is the efficiency of our post-
processing, which nowadays exceeds 95% Jouguet et al. [2011]. The parameter
values chosen for the receiver electronic noise and excess noise correspond to the
observed values in recent CV-QKD experiments Jouguet et al. [2013]. Based on
the values chosen for our system parameters, relevant parameters in Sec. 5.3,
such as ηfib and ηch, can be calculated from which parameter η for each setup
is obtained. The noise parameter nN , for each setup, can similarly be found.
The Raman noise terms, in particular, have been calculated by extracting the
Raman cross section from the experimental measurements reported in Eraerds
et al. [2010]. Note that, in our numerical calculations, we often vary the coupling
loss to study system performance.
In each setup, three cases are considered for the light beam orientation of the
QKD source. In the first case, the semi-angle at half power of the QKD source is
Φ1/2 = 20◦ while the QKD source is placed at the centre of the room’s floor. With
the same Φ1/2, the QKD source is moved to the corner of the room in the second
case. We use Φ1/2 = 1◦ in the third case where the QKD source is located at the
corner of the room, as in the second case, but the beam is directed and focused
toward the QKD receiver or the collection element. A full alignment is assumed
in the third case, while in the other two cases the QKD source is sending light
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upward to the ceiling with a wider beam angle. As for the receiver, we assume
that its telescope is dynamically rotating to collect the maximum power from
the user in the three cases. We assume that the effective receiver’s FOV would
correspond to the numerical aperture (NA) of a single-mode fiber. For single-
mode fibres, NA is about 0.1, which means that the corresponding FOV that can
be coupled to the fiber is around 6◦. Here, the QKD receiver’s FOV is assumed
to be 6◦ in order to maximize the collected power.
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Setup 2:Case1 (DS BB84)
Setup 3:Case1 (MDI-QKD: SPP)
Setup 4:Case1 (MDI-QKD: SPP)
Setup 3:Case2(MDI-QKD: SPP)
Figure 5.7: The secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB,
in setups 2, 3 and 4 in cases 1 and 2. The QKD source is placed at the centre
of the room in case 1, while it is moved to a corner of the room in case 2, with
semi-angle at half power of Φ1/2 = 20◦ in both cases. Receiver’s FOV is 6◦. The
decoy-state and MDI-QKD protocols are used for secret key rate analysis. The
bulb’s PSD in cases 1 and 2 is 10−7 W/nm and 10−8 W/nm, respectively. The
fiber length (L0) is 10 km. (DS: Decoy state; SPP: Single-photon pulse.)
The first thing we study here is whether the loose alignment in cases 1 and
2 would be sufficient for the proper operation of a networked wireless link. The
short answer turns out to be negative for setups 2–4. We already know the result
for setup 1 from the previous work in chapter 4 Elmabrok et al. [2018], in which
we show that, if the only source of lighting in the room is an LED bulb with
a PSD on the order of 10−5–10−6 W/nm, then there will be regions over which
even in cases 1 and 2 the wireless user can exchange secret keys with the Rx box.
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This seems to no longer necessarily hold if we remove the trusted relay node in
the room. In Fig. 5.7, we have plotted the secret key rate versus the coupling
loss for setups 2 to 4. While for a user in the centre of the room, it may be
marginally possible to exchange keys at PSD = 10−7 W/nm, once the user moves
to the corner, the required PSD drops to 10−8 W/nm. This is not strange as
in setups 2–4, we have more loss and additional sources of noise as compared
to setup 1. The required parameter values may not, however, be achievable in
practical settings, and that implies that dynamic beam steering may be needed
at both the transmitter and the receiver side of a wireless QKD link.
There are several other observations that can be made from Fig. 5.7. We have
verified that the MDI-QKD with DS has a rather poor performance, and in order
to tolerate substantial coupling loss, we need to use nearly ideal single-photon
sources. It can also be seen that the performance of setups 3 and 4 is more or
less the same. As expected, moving the BSM module around does not make a
big difference in the key rate. Setup 3 has slightly better performance for the
parameter values chosen here, partly because setup 4 might have slightly more
Raman noise, as will be shown later. But, overall, if one needs to go with a trust-
free relay node, its position can be decided based on the operational convenience
without sacrificing much of the performance. In forthcoming graphs, we then
only present the results for setup 3.
The situation is much more optimistic if full alignment, with Φ1/2 = 1◦,
between the wireless QKD receiver and transmitter is attained (case 3). In this
case, the QKD source is located at a corner of the room and transmits directly
to the QKD receiver or the collector. The full alignment for this narrow beam
would highly improve the channel transmissivity. Figure 5.8(a) shows key rate
versus coupling loss at a PSD of 10−5 W/nm. It can be seen that coupling loss
as high as 35 dB can be tolerated in certain setups. That leaves a large budget
for loss in different elements of the system. As compared to Fig. 5.7, the rate
has also improved by around three orders of magnitude. For a fixed coupling
loss of 10 dB, Fig. 5.8(b) shows how the remaining loss budget can be used to
reach farther central offices. It seems that tens of kilometers are reachable with
practical decoy-state signals in all setups. In this figure, we have also shown the
total key rate for setup 1, which can serve as a benchmark for other setups. For
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Figure 5.8: The secret key rate for setups 1–3 in case 3, in which the full alignment
between the QKD node on the ceiling and wireless transmitter is obtained. The
QKD source is placed at a corner of the room’s floor, with semi-angle at half
power Φ1/2 = 1◦. Receiver’s FOV is 6◦. (a) The secret key rate per pulse versus
the coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB. Fiber length is L0 = 10 km and PSD is 10−5
W/nm. (b) The total secret key rate in bps versus L0 when the coupling loss is
10 dB, PSD is 10−5 W/nm, and the repetition rate is 1 GHz. (DS: Decoy state;
SPP: Single-photon pulse.)
a repetition rate of 1 GHz, keys can be exchanged at a total rate ranging from
kbps to Mbps at moderate distances.
There are additional interesting, but somehow puzzling, points in Fig. 5.8.
For instance, in Fig. 5.8(a), the MDI-QKD curve with DS implies that no secret
keys can be exchanged at low coupling losses. This is counter-intuitive. But, we
have verified that the same behavior is seen in asymmetric MDI-QKD systems,
when one user’s, let’s say Alice, signal is accompanied by a background noise.
Such a background noise would therefore undergo the same amount of loss as the
Alice signal. In a particular regime, where the background noise is comparable
to Bob’s rate of photon arrival at the BSM module, such background photons
could masquerade Bob’s photons and cause errors. In setup 3, the background
noise that accompanies Alice’s signal is that of the bulb noise. If we make the
coupling loss very low, such a noise would easily get into our BSM module and
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Figure 5.9: Noise counts per detector due to (a) forward Raman scattering, (b)
backward Raman scattering, (c) the artificial lighting source, and (d) the total
background noise nN , all in count per pulse (c/p), versus L0. The bulb’s PSD is
10−5 W/nm and ηcoup is 10 dB.
can cause errors. This explains the strange behavior of the MDI-QKD curve
in Fig. 5.8(a). Another detailed point is in Fig. 5.8(b), in which the maximum
security distance for setup 2, with 10 dB of coupling loss, is 40 km. In that
case, one may expect that the security distance for setup 1, with no coupling
loss should be 50 km (corresponding to 10 dB of fiber loss) longer, i.e., 90 km.
The difference is, however, around 25 km. This turns out to be because of the
additional Raman noise at longer distances. In order to understand this and the
previous observation better, we need to explore the noise characteristic of the
system, as we do next.
In Fig. 5.9, we have plotted the noise counts per detector due to (a) forward
Raman scattering (FRS), (b) backward Raman scattering (BRS), (c) the lighting
source bulb, and (d) the total background noise nN for each setup. In each
setup, the (a)–(c) noise components have been obtained from the corresponding
expression for nN by breaking it into its individual terms. There are several
observations to be made. In terms of order of magnitude, all three sources of
noise in Figs. 5.9(a)-(c), are larger or comparable to dark count noise per pulse,
where the latter in our setup is 10−7/pulse. This proves the relevance of our
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analysis that accounts for Raman and background noises. In Fig. 5.9(a,b), the
FRS and BRS increase with distance. This is because of the launch power control
scheme in use, which requires the data transmitters to send a larger amount of
power proportional to the channel loss. The effect of FRS is, however, less than
that of BRS, which is roughly one order of magnitude higher than FRS. BRS
increases with fiber length because of the power control scheme, and will be the
major source of noise in long distances. This increase in BRS justifies the shorter-
than-expected security distances in Fig. 5.8(b). Finally, it can be seen that why
MDI-QKD setups are more vulnerable to bulb noise than the DS system of setup
2. The bulb noise would enter the BSM module in setups 3 and 4 by mainly being
attenuated by the coupling loss, whereas in setup 2, it will be further attenuated
by the channel loss. That is partly why the rate in setup 2 can be higher than
that of setups 3 and 4. Based on these results, one can conclude that, if the MDI
property is not a crucial design factor, setup 2 could offer a reasonable practical
solution to the scenarios where a trusted relay is not available. In the rest of this
section, we will then compare the performance of different protocols that can be
run in setup 2.
Figure 5.10 compares the GG02 performance in setups 1 and 2 with DS-BB84.
In Fig. 5.10(a) we study the resilience of either scheme against background noise
at low values of coupling loss. As has been shown for fibre-based systems Qi
et al. [2010a], CV-QKD can tolerate a higher amount of background noise in this
regime due to the intrinsic filtering properties of its local oscillator. That benefit
would however go away if the coupling loss roughly exceeds 8 dB in our case;
see Fig. 5.10(b). This implies that full beam steering is definitely a must when
it comes to CV-QKD. Depending on the setting of the system, the operator can
decide whether a DV or a CV scheme is the better option.
Figure 5.11 shows the relevant regimes of operation for DV and CV-QKD
schemes in a different way. In Fig. 5.11(a), we have looked at the maximum
coupling loss tolerated by each of the two schemes for a given background noise.
It is clear that while for low values of coupling loss, CV-QKD can tolerate more
noise, at high values of coupling loss DV-QKD is the only option, although it can
tolerate less noise. There is therefore a trade-off between the amount of coupling
loss versus background noise the system can tolerate. In Fig. 5.11(b), we have
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Figure 5.10: Comparison of the GG02 and DS-BB84 protocols for setup 2 and
case 3 (except for the curve labeled GG02 (setup 1)). (a) Secret key rate per
pulse versus total background noise. The latter is assumed to be per detector for
DV-QKD, while it is per spatio-temporal mode for CV-QKD. (b) Secret key rate
per pulse versus coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB. The coupling loss in (a) is 5 dB for
setup 2 and 0 dB for setup 1. The keys exchange in setup 1 is performed via a
trusted relay point between the sender and the recipient, as explained in section
5.2.1. In setup 2, however, it is accomplished without a relay point, in the sense
that the signals transmitted by Alice are collected by a telescope and coupled to
a single-mode fiber to be sent to the central office. There is therefore no coupling
loss (0 dB) in setup 1, whereas 5 dB is assumed for setup 2. The shared fiber
length (L0) is 10 km. The used bulb’s PSD is 10−5 W/nm.
compared the two systems from the clock rate point of view. CV-QKD is often
practically constrained by its low repetition rate. In Fig. 5.11(b), we have fixed
the CV repetition rate to 25 MHz Wang et al. [2015a] and have found out at what
clock rate the DV system offers a higher total key rate than the CV one. For
numerical values used in our simulation this cross-over rate is around 200 MHz,
which is achievable for today’s DV-QKD systems. The ultimate choice between
DV and CV would then depend on the characteristics of the system, such as loss
and noise levels, as well as the clock rate available to the QKD system.
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Figure 5.11: (a) Regions of secure operation for DV-QKD (DS-BB84) and CV-
QKD (GG02) protocols for setup 2 (case 3). The curves show the maximum
tolerable background noise at different values of coupling loss, ηcoup, in dB. The
background noise is calculated per detector for DV-QKD, while it is per spatio-
temporal mode for CV-QKD. (b) Comparison of the two systems from the clock
rate point of view when the CV repetition rate is fixed to 25 MHz. In (a) and
(b), L0 = 10 km. In (b), coupling loss is 5 dB and PSD is 10−5 W/nm.
5.5 Summary
We proposed four practical setups that would facilitate the access part in a hybrid
quantum-classical network. This included scenarios of trusted relay, direct coup-
ling and untrusted relay between the sender and the recipient. We considered DV
and CV-QKD protocols for the secret key analysis. We considered the fiber back-
ground noise induced by Raman scattering, as well as the loss and background
noise in indoor environments. The asymptotic scenario of an infinite number of
signals was assumed in our analysis. It is important now to study the practical
case where a finite number of signals are exchanged between two legitimate users.
This will be studied in the following chapter.
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Table 5.1: Nominal values used for our system parameters.
System Parameters Nominal value
Number of users, N 32
Fiber attenuation coefficient, α, αr 0.2 dB/km, 0.046 /km
AWG insertion loss, Λ 2 dB
Room size, X,Y ,Z (4× 4× 3) m3
Semi-angle at half power of the bulb 70◦
Reflection coefficients of the walls and floor 0.7
Detector area 1 cm2
Refractive index of the concentrator 1.5
Semi-angle at half power of QKD source, Φ1/2 20◦, 1◦
DV-QKD Parameters Nominal value
Average number of photons per signal pulse, µ = ν 0.5
Error correction inefficiency, f 1.16
Dark count per pulse, ndc 10−7
Detector gate width, Td 100 ps
Relative-phase error probability, ed 0.033
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd1, at 880 nm 0.6
Quantum efficiency of detector, ηd2, at 1550 nm 0.3
CV-QKD Parameters Nominal value
Reconciliation efficiency, β 0.95
Receiver overall efficiency, ηB 0.6
Electronic noise (shot noise units), velec 0.015
Excess noise (shot noise units), εrecq 0.002
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Chapter 6
Finite Size Analysis
6.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, we considered the asymptotic scenario where infinitely
many signals we assumed to be exchanged between Alice and Bob. The assump-
tion of emitting signals for an infinitely long time is impractical, but it would
help us compare the performance and the feasibility of different protocols. In the
asymptotic regime, all required key parameters can, in principle, be obtained from
the observed measurement results without any statistical errors. For instance, if
we are interested in estimating error probability, in the asymptotic limit, the ra-
tio between the number of bits in error and the total number of transmitted bits
would give us the corresponding probability. In real-life QKD, however, Alice
would send out a finite number of signals over a certain period of time, and that
will cause statistical fluctuations in parameter estimation. It is thus important
to account for such fluctuations when a finite size of signals is considered in com-
parison with the asymptotic limit. In this chapter, we study such a finite-size key
scenario by comparing the performance of DV and CV-QKD for different data
block sizes for wireless indoor QKD. We specify the minimum block size of keys
that offers practical indoor services. Based on our proposed setups, explained
in the previous chapter, we will investigate the implications this issue in AES
systems that rely on QKD for refreshing their seed keys.
QKD can be used to change the session key of AES in a practical setting. The
key feature of the latter algorithm is that it can encrypt a large volume of data
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with a short key. This is interesting in contrast to OTP, for which the length of
encryption key has to be the same as the message to be sent. AES keys need to
be refreshed by a certain frequency as required by the application. That would
have implications on the QKD system that supports such an AES application.
For instance, for a 256-bit AES with a key refresh rate of 100 times per second, we
would need a secure key rate of 25.6 kbps for the QKD system. In the following,
after describing the system, we provide some numerical results for secret key rates
in setup 2 (case 3) in Fig. 5.3 by taking into account finite size effects for DV and
CV-QKD protocols
6.2 System description
We continue on analysing the same proposed setups, particularly, setup 2 in
Fig. 5.3, and apply the finite-key analysis. As explained earlier, Alice, the sender,
is located in a window-less room of X × Y × Z dimensions, lit by an artificial
light source. The mobile QKD transmitter is placed on the floor and it transmits
light toward the ceiling. The signal collector is fixed at the center of the room’s
ceiling; see Fig. 5.1. We consider setup 2 (case 3) in the settings where full
alignment between the collector and the transmitter is attained. This alignment
is advantageous, as it would highly improve the channel transmissivity. In setup
2, the signals transmitted by Alice are collected by a telescope and coupled to
a single-mode fiber to be sent to the central office. QKD signals, sent through
wireless indoor channels, are combined with classical ones and sent over shared
fiber links to the QKD receiver using DWDM. For encoding the quantum states,
we assume that time-bin encoding techniques is in use, as they offer certain
advantages in both fiber and free-space QKD systems. In particular, they may
suffer less from alignment issues as compared to polarization-based encoding in
wireless environments.
Setup 2 is of interest to be studied in Chapter 6, as it is the most practical
solution when the relay node cannot be trusted. This is the case when the user
is in a public space, e.g., a cafe, a bank, or an airport. The MDI-QKD solution
in setups 3 and 4 imposes demanding conditions on the quality of source and
channel stabilisation as it requires photon indistinguishability for the BSM part.
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We also focus on case 3, which is somehow the worst location for the user, hence
our results would indicate the minimum key rate that can be obtained. As we
have shown earlier, the performance would highly be enhanced if beam steering
is in use, which is what we assume to improve the channel transmittance after
undergoing additional coupling loss.
The performance of finite-size DV-QKD protocol is quantified here by apply-
ing the secret key rate analysis in Zhang et al. [2017b]. This paper provides a tight
bound for the decoy-state method (see the Appendix E.1). A rigorous statistical
fluctuation analysis has been presented in order to account for the finite-size ef-
fects. As for CV-QKD, we use the analysis in Zhang et al. [2017a], where the
finite-size effects have been accounted for in a simple way; see Appendix E.2. The
nominal parameter values used in our simulation are summarized in Table 5.1.
In the following, we present some results for both protocols when different block
sizes of data are considered.
6.3 Results and discussion
The results in this section are the extension of the work in the previous chapters,
but with examining the finite-key scenario. We consider the adverse effects of
the background noise induced by Raman-scattered light on the QKD receivers
due to integration with classical channels. In addition, we consider the loss and
the background noise that arise from indoor environments, as already explained.
In our numerical results, we optimise a set of parameters, which could be tuned
experimentally, in order to bound the optimal secure key rate. The optimization
is important, since for instance, if the average number of photons per pulse, µ,
set to be too high, this would result in dropping the key rate due to the potential
multiphoton states. Similarly, the corresponding key rate would drop when µ, set
to be very low. This is due to the increase in the ratio between the dark counts
and the signal states. As a result, µ must be optimised in order to obtain the
best possible performance.
Figs. 6.1 and 6.2 show the secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss
(dB) for different block sizes of data, when the fiber link is L0 = 10 km and the
bulb’s PSD is 10−5 W/nm. The two figures depict the results of the relevant
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regimes of operation for DV and CV-QKD schemes, respectively. As we saw
before, the key rate in CV-QKD, see Fig. 6.2, is higher than its counterpart in
Fig. 6.1 at low values of coupling loss. This is because that, in CV-QKD, there
is always an output due to the homodyne measurement, while, in DV-QKD, the
transmitted photon must arrive in order to be accounted for. In DV-QKD, the
detector efficiency has a major impact on the generated key rate in comparison
with CV-QKD where the detection efficiency does not have a noticeable effect on
the key rate. In addition, it is apparent that CV-QKD is less tolerant to loss than
DV-QKD. The impact of loss on CV-QKD systems is severe since the difference
between Alice and Eve information about Bob’s key quickly drops and unless we
have super efficient post-processing schemes, we cannot extract a secret key out of
the difference. A short block size would, however, make the margin of acceptable
coupling loss within which CV-QKD can operate even narrower.
In Table 6.1, we show how the size of data can affect the time spent for key
exchange. The figures in the table are based on the DV-QKD rates in Fig. 6.1,
when the coupling loss is 10 dB and the repetition rate is 1 GHz. We show
the length of the secure key and time spent for exchanging such keys. From a
practical point of view, DV-QKD would be better in comparison with CV-QKD;
see Fig. 6.2. This is because that it is less vulnerable to the loss, as well as having
a reasonable acquisition time for a practical size of data. Indeed, the acquisition
time is an important factor, and its practicality depends on the application in
use. For example, a bank customer that uses an AES protocol, supplemented by
QKD generated seeds, for banking transactions, waiting for a few seconds could
be reasonable. In that sense, the numbers in Table 6.1 suggest that our proposed
wireless indoor QKD systems can provide a sufficient number of key bits within
a sensible duration.
It is clear from Table 6.1, that the required time to collect the transmitted data
is increasing proportionally to the block size of data. In which case, the higher
block size of data, the longer acquisition time for data collection. From a practical
point of view, it might be better to exchange a small block size between intended
users in certain applications. This is important, as it results in establishing a
session of key exchange in a short practical time with a reasonable secret key
rate.
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Block size (bits) N = 109 N = 1010 N = 1012 N =∞
Key rate/pulse 4.65× 10−5 1.01× 10−4 1.53× 10−4 1.83× 10−4
Length (secure) key 46.5 kbits 1.01 Mbits 153 Mbits ∞
Acquisition time 1 sec 10 sec 1000 sec ∞
Table 6.1: Comparison between different block sizes and the corresponding secret
key rate, as well as the time spent for exchanging the key for DV-QKD. We
consider a repetition rate of 1 GHz. We assume that the coupling loss is 10 dB
and the length of the shared fiber length (L0) is 10 km.
The minimum block size of keys that offers practical indoor services for the
practical scheme, DV-QKD, would be N = 109. This is the minimum block size
that would tolerate the loss including the coupling loss. It is clear that for setup
2, DV-QKD is more practical, as it would tolerate more loss in comparison to
CV-QKD. In addition, DV-QKD is more practical due to the availability of high
clock rates. For instance, for N = 109, the acquisition time for DV-QKD, when
the clock rate is 1 GHz, is 1 s; see Table 6.1. However, for CV-QKD, where the
clock rate is limited Wang et al. [2015a], Zhang et al. [2017a], the acquisition time
might be much longer.
6.4 Summary
We studied a practical scenario for wireless indoor QKD, where a finite size of
data is exchanged between remote users. We assessed and compared the perform-
ance of DV and CV-QKD protocols. This is done by considering different block
sizes, and computing the corresponding secret key rate, as well as the time spent
for exchanging the keys. We conclude that using DV-QKD we can establish a
sufficiently long key in a reasonable time of a few seconds. This further indicates
the practicality of wireless indoor QKD setups.
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Figure 6.1: The secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss (dB) for setup 2
(case 3), considering different block sizes using DV-QKD (DS-BB84). The QKD
source is placed at a corner of the room’s floor, with semi-angle at half power
Φ1/2 = 1◦, and receiver’s FOV is 6◦. Fiber length is L0 = 10 km and the bulb’s
PSD is 10−5 W/nm.
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Figure 6.2: The secret key rate per pulse versus the coupling loss (dB) for setup
2 (case 3), considering different block sizes using CV-QKD (GG02). The QKD
source is placed at a corner of the room’s floor, with semi-angle at half power
Φ1/2 = 1◦, and receiver’s FOV is 6◦. Fiber length is L0 = 10 km and the bulb’s
PSD is 10−5 W/nm.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and future work
7.1 Conclusions
We studied the feasibility of wireless indoor QKD in a window-less room lit by
an artificial source. Such systems could provide the first link within a larger
quantum network or facilitate the use of QKD in common areas for many users.
We showed that there would exist a practical regime of operation within which
such a wireless QKD system could generate secret keys in indoor environments.
We used optical wireless communications models to characterize the path loss
and background noise in the channel. Our results showed that with even mild
assumptions on the alignment of the QKD transmitter and receiver, it would be
possible to exchange secret keys if the room is lit by white LED bulbs. Such
light sources have very little power spectral density at the operating wavelengths
of interest for a QKD system, and because of their low energy consumption
are expected to be ubiquitously used in the future. Our results further showed
that additional enhancement could be obtained if beam steering techniques were
employed.
The type of equipment needed for the above setup is within reach of our cur-
rent quantum and classical technologies. With recent progress in integrated QKD
devices Ma et al. [2016], Sibson et al. [2017], Vest et al. [2015], it is possible to
think of a portable device equipped with QKD capabilities. A handheld QKD
prototype has, in fact, already been implemented for short-range handheld-to-
ATM key exchange Chun et al. [2017], Duligall et al. [2006]. Because of high
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path loss in integrated optics systems, the integration requirement for time-bin
encoding may be harsher than that of polarization encoding. One can, however,
think of hybrid solutions where an integrated dual-rail setup is used for the initial
encoding, which will then be converted to a single-rail time bin encoding using an
external delay line. We also need random number generators. In many scenarios,
we can generate random bits oﬄine, store them on the device, and use them
during the key-exchange protocol. As for the QKD receiver, we can use some
of the existing technologies for Li-Fi for collection and alignment. For instance,
we can use a non-imaging optical concentrator, such as a compound parabolic
collector, followed by a bandpass filter at the receiver. The output of the phase-
decoding interferometer is then passed to one of the two single-photon avalanche
diodes. Such detectors have also been considered for use in Li-Fi systems Chitnis
& Collins [2014]. Overall, with the progress made toward implementing QKD
modules with integrated optics along with the progress in beam steering in clas-
sical optical communications Gomez et al. [2015], our proposed system can enable
high-rate wireless access to future quantum-classical networks Elmabrok & Razavi
[2016].
We also proposed and studied four configurations that enabled wireless access
to hybrid quantum-classical networks. All these setups included an initial wireless
indoor link that connected a quantum user to the network. Each user in the access
network could also communicate classically with the central office via another
wavelength in the same band. We considered setups in which a local relay point
could be trusted as well as setups where such trust was not required. We showed
that with proper beam alignment it was possible, in both DV- and CV-QKD, to
achieve positive key rates for both trusted and untrusted relay points in certain
indoor environments.
The choice of the optimum setup would depend on various system paramet-
ers, which we studied in our analysis. For instance, we found that our MDI-
QKD setups, which offered trust-free QKD immune to measurement attacks,
were mostly insensitive to the positions of their measurement modules, but could
suffer harshly from the background noise generated in the indoor environment. If
immunity to measurement attacks was not required, we could simply collect QKD
signals at the ceiling and couple them into optical fibers along with other data
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channels. With decoy-state techniques, we showed that we could tolerate up to
30 dB of coupling loss in such a setting, provided that full alignment is achieved.
At long distances, the Raman noise induced by the data channels would also
take its toll on the maximum secure distance, limiting it to tens of kilometers.
Both Raman noise and the background noise due to the artificial light source in
the indoor environment could be orders of magnitude larger than the static dark
count of single-photon detectors. We also showed that in the low-coupling-loss
regime, CV-QKD could offer higher rates and more resilience to background noise
than DV-QKD systems. But, overall, DV-QKD schemes could offer a more stable
and flexible operation adaptable to a wider range of scenarios. In short, using
our analytical results, we can identify the winner in realistic setups that enable
high-rate wireless access to future quantum networks.
In order to have a practical system, we need to apply the finite-key analysis to
our proposed configurations. We compared the performance of DV and CV-QKD
in setup 2 (case 3) over a range of data block sizes. We show that to what extent
the block size of keys can be practical in wireless indoor QKD. It turns out that
DV would outperform CV-QKD. The reason is that DV-QKD is less vulnerable
to the loss, as well as having a reasonable acquisition time for a practical size of
data.
7.2 Future work
Setups 1 and 3 should be examined with a finite size of data, to evaluate their
practicality. These setups are useful for end users in certain scenarios as already
explained. Setup 1 is of interest whenever a trusted node between the sender and
the recipient exists. This can be inside a building where a QKD relay node can
be physically secured. Setup 3, however, is applicable whenever the relay point
in indoor environment is not secure for wireless users. This is in places such as
a coffee shop or an airport, where users may not necessarily trust the owners of
the local system. It is interesting if a wireless localization system Raharijaona
et al. [2017], Zhang et al. [2010] is considered in such places. This is important to
improve the channel transmittance and also to reduce the impact of background
noise, due to the established alignment. A new direction of this research could
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be by employing indoor positioning systems for wireless indoor QKD. This would
involve reference wireless nodes which are placed in fixed positions, a QKD re-
ceiver in our case, and mobile nodes, such as laptops, in which a QKD source is
embedded. A real-time tracking system Dardari et al. [2015] can also be exploited
for freely movable users.
The secret key rate for a QKD scheme is essential for assessing its performance.
For the sake of improving the key rate, quantum information can be encoded using
the orbital angular momentum (OAM) of light. This degree of freedom of a single
photon is exploited for multidimensional QKD Djordjevic [2013], where qudits are
mapped into a single photon. As a result, a single photon can transfer more than 1
bit of information. For wireless indoor QKD, digital micro-mirror devices (DMD)
can be used to generate rapidly the desired spatial modes for a high dimensional
QKD system Mirhosseini et al. [2015]. This can be accomplished by diffracting
individual photons from a plane-wave state produced by a normal laser. Another
possible solution to improve the key rate is by employing existing schemes such
as multiple-input and multiple-output (MIMO) technique for QKD Gabay &
Arnon [2006]. Both methods would allow many independent data streams to be
transmitted over the same spatial wireless channel.
Our results could be the motivate to researchers for experimental realization
of wireless indoor QKD, to be ready for commercial applications. Many QKD
experiments have been implemented, such as Bacco et al. [2013], Zhao et al. [2006],
and the main ingredients, from attenuated laser pulses to single photon detectors,
are already available. It has been shown in recent work Rusca et al. [2018] that
using the 1-decoy approach Rusca et al. [2018] is advantageous in comparison
with the 2-decoy system Ma et al. [2005]. The 1-decoy state QKD protocol
would simplify the QKD encoder and make it cheaper. Indoor optical wireless
communications with a higher capacity, has also been implemented Gomez et al.
[2015]. This would ease the full implementation of combining QKD and OWC.
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Appendix A
DS-BB84 key rate analysis
In this appendix, the secret key generation rate of the DS-BB84 protocol is cal-
culated. The lower bound for the key rate, in the limit of an infinitely long key,
is given Ma et al. [2005]
Rdecoy > q{Q1(1− h(e1)− fQµh(Eµ)}, (A.1)
where q is the basis-sift factor, which is equal to 1/2 in the original BB84 protocol.
This is due to discarding half of the detection events in X and Z bases after the
sifting procedure. Here, we use the efficient BB84 protocol Lo et al. [2005], which
allows us to choose unevenly betweenX and Z bases, in which case q can approach
1. If infinite number of decoy states are used, the parameters in (A.1) are given
as follows: Q1, which is called the single-photon gain, is the probability that Bob
gets a click and Alice has sent one photon, and it is given by:
Q1 = Y1µe−µ, (A.2)
where µ is the average number of photons per pulse for the signal state and Y1 is
the yield of single photons. The latter is defined as the probability of getting a
click provided that Alice has sent exactly a single photon, which is given by:
Y1 = 1− (1− η)(1− nN)2, (A.3)
where η is the total system transmittance given by ηdHDC/2 (the factor 1/2 rep-
resents the loss incurred in a passive time-bin decoder), and nN is the total noise
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per detector given by nB +nD, where nD is the dark count rate per pulse for each
of the two single-photon detectors at the Bob’s receiver. As for dark count noise
or dark current noise, the detector tends to click despite the absence of light. The
dark count rate (γdc) varies from one detector to another. For instance, it ranges
from (100-1000)/s for an APD, to (1-100)/s for superconducting detectors Dusek
et al. [2006]. The average dark count over a period (τ) is then: nD = γdc.τ .
nB = n(1)B +n
(2)
B ; e1 is the error probability in the single-photon case, and is given
by:
e1 =
e0Y1 − (e0 − ed)η(1− nN)
Y1
, (A.4)
where e0 = 1/2 and ed models the error, caused by channel distortions, in the
relative phase between the two pulses generated by the phase encoder; Qµ is the
probability that Bob gets a click, when Alice has sent a coherent state with an
average number of photons µ, and, it is given by Panayi et al. [2014]:
Qµ = 1− e−ηµ(1− nN)2. (A.5)
In (A.1), the overall QBER is represented by Eµ, and it is given by
Eµ =
e0Qµ − (e0 − ed)(1− e−ηµ)(1− nN)
Qµ
. (A.6)
Finally, h(x) is the Shannon binary entropy function given by
h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x). (A.7)
If we use a two-decoy-state protocol, such as vacuum+weak, Y1, Q1, and e1
are, respectively, bounded by Ma et al. [2005]
Y1 > Y L,ν1,ν21 =
µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[Qν1eν1 −Qν2eν2
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµeµ − Y L0 )], (A.8)
Q1 > QL,ν1,ν21 =
µ2e−µ
µν1 − µν2 − ν21 + ν22
[Qν1eν1 −Qν2eν2
− ν
2
1 − ν22
µ2
(Qµeµ − Y L0 )], (A.9)
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and
e1 ≤ eU,ν1,ν21 =
Eν1Qν1e
ν1 − Eν2Qν2eν2
(ν1 − ν2)Y L,ν1,ν21
, (A.10)
where ν1 and ν2 are the average number of photons per pulse for the decoy states
signals; Qν1 and Qν2 can be obtained from (12); Eν1 and Eν2 are the overall QBER
for decoy-state signals given by (13). In the above equations, Y0 is the probability
of having a click due to the background and/or dark count noise, whose lower
bound is given by
Y0 > Y L0 = max{
ν1Qν2e
ν2 − ν2Qν1eν1
ν1 − ν2 , 0}. (A.11)
The above lower (L) or upper (U) bounds can be used in (A.1) to find a lower
bound on the key rate.
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Appendix B
RFI-QKD key rate analysis
In RFI-QKD, the correlation quantity, C, is used to estimate Eve’s information,
and it is defined by Laing et al. [2010b]
C = 〈XAXB〉2 + 〈XAYB〉2 + 〈YAXB〉2 + 〈YAYB〉2, (B.1)
which can be written as Wang et al. [2015b]
C = (1− 2EXX)2 + (1− 2EXY )2 + (1− 2EY X)2 + (1− 2EY Y )2, (B.2)
where E terms represent error rates in different scenarios. It can be shown that C
is independent of ξ. For our numerical analysis, ξ is then assumed to be zero. In
this case, we can assume that EXY = EY X = 1/2, and EXX = EY Y = EZZ = e1,
where e1 is the error probability in the single-photon case as calculated in (A.4).
The parameter C can then be calculated by
C = 2(1− 2e1)2. (B.3)
Eve’s information is bounded by Laing et al. [2010b]
IE = (1− e1)h[1 + νmax2 ] + e1h[
1 + f(νmax)
2 ], (B.4)
where νmax and f(νmax), respectively, are given by
νmax = min[
1
1− e1
√
C/2, 1], (B.5)
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and
f(νmax) =
√
C/2− (1− e1)2ν2max
e1
. (B.6)
By substituting (B.3) in the above equations, IE is then given by
IE = e1 + (1− e1)h[(1− 3e1/2)(1− e1)]. (B.7)
The estimated key generation rate for RFI-QKD with decoy-state technique
is then given by Wang et al. [2015b]
R > −Qµfh(Eµ) +Q1(1− IE), (B.8)
where Qµ, Eµ, e1, and Q1 are the same as those given for the decoy-state BB84
protocol.
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Appendix C
MDI-QKD key rate analysis
In this appendix, we summarize the secret key rate of the MDI-QKD protocol.
The rates for the ideal single-photon source and the decoy-state protocols, re-
spectively, are
RSPPMDI−QKD = Y11[1− h(e11:X)− fh(e11:Z)] (C.1)
and
RDSMDI−QKD = Q11(1− h(e11;X))− fQµν;Zh(Eµν;Z). (C.2)
In the above, Q11 is the gain of the single-photon states given by
Q11 = µνe−µ−νY11, (C.3)
where µ (ν) is the mean number of photons in the signal state sent by Alice (Bob)
and Y11 is the yield of the single-photon states given by
Y11 =(1− nN)2[ηaηb/2 + (2ηa + 2ηb − 3ηaηb)nN
+ 4(1− ηa)(1− ηb)n2N ], (C.4)
where nN represents the total noise per detector and ηa and ηb are, respectively,
the total transmittance between Alice and Bob sides and that of Charlie Panayi
et al. [2014]. In (C.1) and (C.2), e11;Z , e11;X , Qµν;Z and Eµν;Z , respectively,
represent the QBER in the Z basis for single-photon states, the phase error for
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single-photon states, the overall gain and the QBER in the Z-basis, which are
given by Panayi et al. [2014]:
e11;XY11 =Y11/2− (1/2− ed)(1− nN)2ηaηb/2,
e11;ZY11 =Y11/2− (1/2− ed)(1− nN)2(1− 2nN)ηaηb/2,
Qµν;Z =QC +QE,
Eµν;ZQµν;Z =edQc + (1− ed)QE, (C.5)
where
QC =2(1− nN)2e−µ
′
/2[1− (1− nN)e−ηaµ/2]
× [1− (1− nN)e−ηbν/2]
QE =2nN(1− nN)2e−µ
′
/2[I0(2x)− (1− nN)e−µ
′
/2], (C.6)
with x = √ηaµηbν/2, µ′ = ηaµ+ ηbν and I0 being the modified Bessel function.
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Appendix D
GG02 key rate analysis
The secret key rate for GG02 with reverse reconciliation, under collective attacks,
is given by Fossier et al. [2009]
K = βIAB − χBE, (D.1)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, IAB is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob, which, for a Gaussian channel, is given by
IAB =
1
2 log2
V + χtot
1 + χtot
, (D.2)
where V and χtot are, respectively, the total variance and the total noise given by
V = VA + 1, (D.3)
with VA being the variance of Alice’s quadrature modulation and
χtot = χline + χhom/ηch, (D.4)
in which
χline =
1− ηch
ηch
+ ε,
χhom =
1− ηB
ηB
+ velec
ηB
, (D.5)
are, respectively, the noise due to the channel and the noise stemming from
homodyne detection. Also, the parameters ηB, velec, ε and ηch, are, respectively,
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Bob’s overall efficiency, electronic noise variance induced by homodyne electronic
board, excess noise, and the channel transmittance.
In (D.1), χBE is the Holevo information between Eve and Bob, and it is given
by
χBE = g(Λ1) + g(Λ2)− g(Λ3)− g(Λ4), (D.6)
where
g(x) = (x+ 12 ) log2(
x+ 1
2 )− (
x− 1
2 ) log2(
x− 1
2 ), (D.7)
with
Λ1/2 =
√
(A±√A2 − 4B)/2,
Λ3/4 =
√
(C ±√C2 − 4D)/2. (D.8)
In the above equations:
A =V 2(1− 2ηch) + 2ηch + η2ch(V + χline)2,
B =η2ch(V χline + 1)2,
C =V
√
B + ηch(V + χline) + Aχhom
ηch(V + χtot)
,
D =
√
B
V +
√
Bχhom
ηch(V + χtot)
. (D.9)
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Appendix E
Finite-Key Analysis
E.1 Decoy-State BB84
The secret key rate for decoy-state BB84, when a finite number of data is con-
sidered, is given by Zhang et al. [2017b]
Kz >M szL1 [1− h(epszU1 )]−M szfh(Esz), (E.1)
where M sz and Esz are, respectively, the overall gain and QBER for a given
block size of data, N . f is inefficiency of error correction and h(x) is the Shannon
binary entropy function given in A.7.
In E.1, in order to compute M szL1 and e
pszU
1 , which are, respectively, the single-
photon gain and the error probability in the single-photon case, we need first to
estimate ML1 and eU1 . The former is given by
ML1 = Y ∗L1 N(e−µµqs + e−νqw), (E.2)
where qs and qw are the rate that Alice encodes a signal state and a decoy state
with µ and ν, respectively. N is the block size of data, and Y ∗1 is given by
Y ∗1 > Y ∗L1 =
µ
µν − µν2
(
EL[Qw]eν − EU [Qs]eµ ν
2
µ2
−µ
2 − ν2
µ2
EU [Qv]
)
. (E.3)
In E.3, EL and EU are the expected values for lower and upper bounds of
the measurable quantities. Qs, Qw, and Qv represent the overall gain for signal,
decoy, and vacuum states, respectively Zhang et al. [2017b].
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E.1 Decoy-State BB84
In order to compute EL and EU in E.3, we use Chernoff bound Zhang et al.
[2017b]. In this case, for a measurement result χ, and a failure probability, ε, if
χ=0, we use
EL(χ) = 0,
EU(χ) = β,
(E.4)
where β = −ln(ε/2). If χ > 0, we use
EL(χ) = χ1 + δL ,
EU(χ) = χ1− δU ,
(E.5)
where δL and δU can be obtained by solving
 eδL
(1 + δL)1+δL
χ/(1+δL) = 12ε, e−δU
(1− δU)1−δU
χ/(1−δU ) = 12ε.
(E.6)
If χ ≥ 6β, δL and δU in E.6, are computed as
δL = δU = 3β +
√
8βχ+ β2
2(χ− β) . (E.7)
By substituting Y ∗1 in E.2, ML1 ia found. Then, in E.1, M szL1 =χL for χ =
ps1M
L
1 . χL = (1− δ)χ, where
δ =
−ln(ε/2) +
√
[ln(ε/2)]2 − 8ln(ε/2)χ
2χ . (E.8)
In the above equations, a measurement result χ for signals states, can be
computed as M s = QsqsN , where Qs is the overall gain, in a certain basis.
The same thing is applicable for decoy and vacuum states. In this case, in E.3,
EU [Qs]=EU [M s]/(qsN).
In E.1, the upper bound of the phase error rate epsz1 is given by
epszU1 = ebxU1 + θ. (E.9)
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E.2 GG02
where θ accounts for the error in estimating e1 Zhang et al. [2017b], and ebxU1 can
be computed as
eU1 =
(e1M1)U
ML1
= (e1Y
∗
1 )U
Y ∗L1
= E
U [EwQw]eν − EL[EvQv]
Y ∗L1 ν
, (E.10)
where
(e1M1)U = (e1Y1∗)UN(e−µµqs + e−ννqw). (E.11)
In E.10, EU [EwQw] = EU [EwMw]/qwN , and similarly for EL[EvQv].
E.2 GG02
the secret key rate, bounded by collective attacks, is given by Zhang et al. [2017a]
K = (1− α)(1− FER)[βIAB − χBE −∆(n)], (E.12)
where ∆(n) is related to the security of the privacy amplification, and it is com-
puted using Eq. 4 in Leverrier et al. [2010], FER is the frame error rate related
to the reconciliation efficiency, and α is the system overhead. IAB and χBE are
given in Appendix D.
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